Morality vs Philosophy

How do we make moral decisions: rationally or emotionally?

Source: The Straits Times, 10/4/9, p.A29
Headline: The end of philosophy
Writer: David Brooks

Quote1:
Socrates talked. The assumption behind his approach to philosophy ... is that moral thinking is mostly a matter of reason and deliberation: Think through moral problems. Find a just principle. Apply it.

Comment1:
This sets out Socrates' position: Moral thinking is a matter of reason. Let us capture this as (moral reason).

Quote2:
One problem with this kind of approach to morality, as Michael Gazzaniga writes in his 2008 book, Human, is that "it has been hard to find any correlation between moral reasoning and proactive moral behaviour, such as helping other people. In fact, in most studies, none has been found". ...

Comment2:
Here's an objection. It takes the form of a Modus Tollens (If P then Q, not-Q, hence not-P):

Premiss1: If (moral reason), then (correlation)
Premiss2: Not-(correlation)
Conclusions: Hence, not-(moral reason) [suppressed]

The argument is valid, meaning the premisses do entail the conclusion. Premiss1 is necessarily true. Premiss2 is a statement of fact. The argument is sound. We must accept it. It is not the case that moral thinking is a matter of reason.

Quote3:
Moral judgements are ... rapid intuitive decisions and involve the emotion processing parts of the brain.

Comment3:
This is the alternative position, which we shall capture as (moral emotion). What is the argument for this position?

Quote4:
Most of us make snap moral judgements about what feels fair or not, or what feels good or not. We start doing this when we are babies, before we have language. And even as adults, we often can't explain to ourselves why something feels wrong. In other words, reasoning comes later and is often guided by the emotions that preceded it. ...

Comment4:
The argument offered is a common and typical experience all of us have had. Therefore, this common and typical experience is the way it is: (moral emotion). This appeal to a common and typical experience is often used in philosophy -- and is usually accepted.

Quote5:
The question then becomes: What shapes moral emotions in the first place? The answer has long been evolution, but in recent years there's an increasing appreciation that evolution isn't just about competition. It's also about cooperation within groups. ... The first nice thing about this evolutionary approach to morality is that it emphasises the social nature of moral intuition. ... The second nice thing is that it entails a warmer view of human nature. ... The third nice thing is that it explains the haphazard way most of us lead our lives without destroying dignity and choice. ...

Comment5:
This pushes the enquiry one step back: Whence (moral emotions)? The three "nice things" describes the flavour of this view. The fact of (moral emotions) is not challenged.

Quote6:
The rise and now dominance of this emotional approach to morality is an epochal change. It challenges all sorts of traditions. It challenges the bookish way philosophy is conceived by most people.

Comment6:
This pushes the enquiry one step forward: So what? So it challenges the "bookish way" of philosophy -- which is a reference to the primacy of reason usually adopted by philosophy and philosophers. Again, the fact of (moral emotion) is not challenged.

Comment7:
So we return to the arguments found in Comment2 and Comment4. It is not the case that moral thinking is a matter of reason. What we practise is (moral emotion).

The writer does not pose the obvious objection: But we do not all have the same moral emotions -- as seen in the controversies that rage over issues like abortion, euthanasia, corporate responsibility etc. How then are we to decide what is the moral thing to do? Surely the resort must be to reason and deliberation -- the Socratic approach.

How does this square with Quote1?

We need to make the is vs ought distinction. It is the case that we practise (moral emotion). It ought to be the case that we practise (moral reason).

END