I have just finished watching Ip Man 2. It is a great action movie. The plot is thinnner than rice paper, but it's a great action movie.
English boxer Twister disparages Chinese martial artists as dancers rather than fighters, and scornfully challenges them to duels. Master Hung accepts the challenge. Twister beats Master Hung to a pulp. Master Hung refuses to surrender, saying that he cannot allow Chinese martial arts be insulted. The fight continues -- until Master Hung dies in the boxing ring.
After the funeral, Master Ip challenges Twister. He beats Twister to a pulp. At the post-fight interview, Master Ip says: "I did not fight Twister to prove that Chinese martial arts are superior to Western boxing. I did it to prove that even though people are not equal in social status, we are equal in deserving of respect." These philosophical words were greeted with a standing ovation -- by both Chinese and English members of the audience.
I have questions.
Master Hung fights to protest the insult to Chinese martial arts. Look around the world today. Many use violence to protest what they perceive as insults to them. The rest of the world calls the violent protesters names, which are seen as further insults, to be replied to with more violence. Is violence the correct answer to insults?
Master Ip said his philosophical words after he had beaten Twister to a pulp. Suppose Twister had beaten Master Ip to a pulp, or even killed him the way he had earlier killed Master Hung. I doubt then that the same philosophical words would have evoked the same emotional response, the same moral approval. It appears that the outcome of the fight is relevant to the truth of those words. Can this be?
People do generally say that respect is not freely given, but must be earned and deserved. One does not respect those not deserving of it. This directly contradicts the claim that all people are equal in deserving of respect. (Social status is irrelevant to this consideration.) Are Master Ip's philosophical words, emotionally evocative as they were in the given context, upon cold examination after all not true?
Enjoy the movie -- then think about it.
Friday, 30 April 2010
Philosophy cafe interrupted?
When I went to Nook on 21 April (third Wed of the month), I found it closed. There was a blackboard notice saying it is closed for normal business but available for special bookings. My apologies to anyone who went there and found it closed.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
Tuesday, 27 April 2010
Does the Internet worsen polarisation?
Headline: Mad Max public square on the Internet
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
Is Obama serious about Mars?
US President Obama has announced his space programme of a manned trip to Mars. Writer Gwynne Dyer is sceptical. We examine the arguments.
Headline: Obama's Martian odyssey more a charade?
Source: The Straits Times, 22/4/10
Writer: Gwynne Dyer
Quote1
In the real world, the United States is giving up on space, although it is trying hard to conceal its retreat.
Comment1
As in most essays, the conclusion is placed right up front. What is the argument for this conclusion?
Quote2
Last week, three Americans with a very special status -- they have all commanded missions to the Moon -- made their dismay public. In an open letter, Mr Neil Armstrong, the first human being to walk on the Moon, Mr Jim Lovell, commander of Apollo 13, and Mr Eugene Cernan, commander of Apollo 17, condemned President Barack Obama's plans for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) as the beginning of a "long downhill slide to mediocrity" for the US.
Comment2
These three persons are offered as authorities. They are astronauts, occupying a special niche in the US space programme. That does not give them an overview of the programme. This is a case of Argumentum ad Verecundiam -- appeal to false authority.
Quote3
The letter was timed to coincide with Mr Obama's visit to Cape Canaveral to defend his new policy, which abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020, or indeed ever.
Comment3
If the new policy explicitly "abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020", then the case is made that the US has given up on the Moon -- but not necessarily also the rest of space.
Quote4
Mr Obama insists that this sacrifice will allow the US to pursue a more ambitious goal, but his plan to send Americans to Mars by the late 2030s has the distinct political advantage of not needing really heavy investment while he is still in office -- even if he wins a second term. ...
Comment4
It is implied that the "political advantage" is the aim of the new policy. No proof is offered that this is so. It remains logically open for the "political advantage" to be just a byproduct of the new policy, and not its sinister aim.
Quote5
Those are indeed ambitious goals, and they would require heavy-lift rockets that do not yet exist. But the "vigorous new technology development" programme that might lead to those rockets will get only US$600m annually (the price of four F22 fighters) for the next five years, and actual work on building such rockets would probably not begin until 2015. ...
Comment5
At last we have an argument for the conclusion "give up on space" (GUOS). Here it is, formally presented:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument form is the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q/P//hence Q). We take P2 as an empirically true fact. However, P1 is not intuitively true -- starting work in 2015 suggests a resumption of space exploration, not "giving up on space".
Quote6
[Meanwhile, the US] will essentially be a hitch-hiker on other countries' space programmes. Mr Obama suggests that this embarrassment will be avoided because private enterprise will come up with cheap and efficient "space taxis". ...
Comment6
The notion of "space taxis" changes the argument presented in Comment5:
P3: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis), then (not-GUOS)
P4: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis)
C2: Hence, (not-GUOS)
This is a valid Modus Ponens. If P3 and P4 are true, then the conclusion must follow.
Quote7
No doubt they will get various vehicles up there. But if they can build something by 2020 that can lift as much as the ancient Shuttles into a comparable orbit, let along something bigger that can go higher, I will eat my hat. Space technology eats up capital almost as fast as weapons technology, and these entrepreneurs have no more than tens of billions at most.
Comment7
The "eat my hat" remark is a rhetorical device that rides on the valid Modus Tollens (If P then Q/not-Q//hence, not-P) argument form:
P5: If (lift Shuttles), then (eat hat)
P6: Not-(eat hat) [because impossible]
C3: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Now for the real argument:
P7: If (lift Shuttles), then (cost more than tens of billions)
P8: Not-(cost more than tens of billions) [entrepreneurs don't have such wealth]
C4: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Remember that (lift Shuttles) refers to the capacity of the "space taxis". So:
not-(lift Shuttles) = not-(space taxis)
This denies the truth of P4 in Comment6. The conclusion (not-GUOS) then cannot follow. GUOS remains possible.
Quote8
Does Mr Obama know this? Very probably, yes.
Comment8
The word "this" refers to "space taxis are not possible". This returns us to the argument in Comment5, which I reproduce here:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument goes only so far as to conclude GUOS. But there is a further claim (see Quote1) of "trying hard to conceal its retreat". No argument has yet been put forward to support this further claim.
Quote9
One suspects that he [Mr Obama] would actually be cutting Nasa's budget, not very slightly raising it, if its centre of gravity (and employment) were not in the swing state of Florida, where he cannot afford to lose any votes.
Comment9
Here is a hinted (it is not explicitly stated) argument for "trying hard to conceal its retreat". Here is a reasonable construction:
P9: If (tell truth), then (lose Florida votes)
P10: If (lose Florida votes), then (lose US elections) [because Florida is a swing state]
P11: Not-(lose US elections)
C5: Hence, not-(tell truth)
This is a Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R / Hence, If P then R) combined with a Modus Tollens. It is a valid argument form. The three premisses can be taken to be true. The argument is sound. We have a case for "trying hard to conceal its retreat".
Quote10
What is going on here is a charade.
Comment10
So we arrive at the final conclusion. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
That there is no real odyssey is argued for in Comment5, and repeated in Comment8. That there is a false front being put up is argued for in Comment9. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
END
Headline: Obama's Martian odyssey more a charade?
Source: The Straits Times, 22/4/10
Writer: Gwynne Dyer
Quote1
In the real world, the United States is giving up on space, although it is trying hard to conceal its retreat.
Comment1
As in most essays, the conclusion is placed right up front. What is the argument for this conclusion?
Quote2
Last week, three Americans with a very special status -- they have all commanded missions to the Moon -- made their dismay public. In an open letter, Mr Neil Armstrong, the first human being to walk on the Moon, Mr Jim Lovell, commander of Apollo 13, and Mr Eugene Cernan, commander of Apollo 17, condemned President Barack Obama's plans for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) as the beginning of a "long downhill slide to mediocrity" for the US.
Comment2
These three persons are offered as authorities. They are astronauts, occupying a special niche in the US space programme. That does not give them an overview of the programme. This is a case of Argumentum ad Verecundiam -- appeal to false authority.
Quote3
The letter was timed to coincide with Mr Obama's visit to Cape Canaveral to defend his new policy, which abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020, or indeed ever.
Comment3
If the new policy explicitly "abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020", then the case is made that the US has given up on the Moon -- but not necessarily also the rest of space.
Quote4
Mr Obama insists that this sacrifice will allow the US to pursue a more ambitious goal, but his plan to send Americans to Mars by the late 2030s has the distinct political advantage of not needing really heavy investment while he is still in office -- even if he wins a second term. ...
Comment4
It is implied that the "political advantage" is the aim of the new policy. No proof is offered that this is so. It remains logically open for the "political advantage" to be just a byproduct of the new policy, and not its sinister aim.
Quote5
Those are indeed ambitious goals, and they would require heavy-lift rockets that do not yet exist. But the "vigorous new technology development" programme that might lead to those rockets will get only US$600m annually (the price of four F22 fighters) for the next five years, and actual work on building such rockets would probably not begin until 2015. ...
Comment5
At last we have an argument for the conclusion "give up on space" (GUOS). Here it is, formally presented:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument form is the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q/P//hence Q). We take P2 as an empirically true fact. However, P1 is not intuitively true -- starting work in 2015 suggests a resumption of space exploration, not "giving up on space".
Quote6
[Meanwhile, the US] will essentially be a hitch-hiker on other countries' space programmes. Mr Obama suggests that this embarrassment will be avoided because private enterprise will come up with cheap and efficient "space taxis". ...
Comment6
The notion of "space taxis" changes the argument presented in Comment5:
P3: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis), then (not-GUOS)
P4: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis)
C2: Hence, (not-GUOS)
This is a valid Modus Ponens. If P3 and P4 are true, then the conclusion must follow.
Quote7
No doubt they will get various vehicles up there. But if they can build something by 2020 that can lift as much as the ancient Shuttles into a comparable orbit, let along something bigger that can go higher, I will eat my hat. Space technology eats up capital almost as fast as weapons technology, and these entrepreneurs have no more than tens of billions at most.
Comment7
The "eat my hat" remark is a rhetorical device that rides on the valid Modus Tollens (If P then Q/not-Q//hence, not-P) argument form:
P5: If (lift Shuttles), then (eat hat)
P6: Not-(eat hat) [because impossible]
C3: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Now for the real argument:
P7: If (lift Shuttles), then (cost more than tens of billions)
P8: Not-(cost more than tens of billions) [entrepreneurs don't have such wealth]
C4: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Remember that (lift Shuttles) refers to the capacity of the "space taxis". So:
not-(lift Shuttles) = not-(space taxis)
This denies the truth of P4 in Comment6. The conclusion (not-GUOS) then cannot follow. GUOS remains possible.
Quote8
Does Mr Obama know this? Very probably, yes.
Comment8
The word "this" refers to "space taxis are not possible". This returns us to the argument in Comment5, which I reproduce here:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument goes only so far as to conclude GUOS. But there is a further claim (see Quote1) of "trying hard to conceal its retreat". No argument has yet been put forward to support this further claim.
Quote9
One suspects that he [Mr Obama] would actually be cutting Nasa's budget, not very slightly raising it, if its centre of gravity (and employment) were not in the swing state of Florida, where he cannot afford to lose any votes.
Comment9
Here is a hinted (it is not explicitly stated) argument for "trying hard to conceal its retreat". Here is a reasonable construction:
P9: If (tell truth), then (lose Florida votes)
P10: If (lose Florida votes), then (lose US elections) [because Florida is a swing state]
P11: Not-(lose US elections)
C5: Hence, not-(tell truth)
This is a Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R / Hence, If P then R) combined with a Modus Tollens. It is a valid argument form. The three premisses can be taken to be true. The argument is sound. We have a case for "trying hard to conceal its retreat".
Quote10
What is going on here is a charade.
Comment10
So we arrive at the final conclusion. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
That there is no real odyssey is argued for in Comment5, and repeated in Comment8. That there is a false front being put up is argued for in Comment9. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
END
Thursday, 18 March 2010
Does a lover have rights?
This is a report of the philosophy café session on 17 March 2010.
Our question for the evening is “Does a lover have rights?” After some vigorous efforts to define “lover” in its various versions, we decided we were better off rephrasing the question. And so the question for the evening became “Does a participant of an affair have the right to expose the affair?”
We perceive two interpretations of the word “right”. The first is a “freedom to do”, as in freedom to expose the affair. There is nothing in the law to say that a participant of an affair cannot expose his or her affair. Hence, he or she has the right to expose the affair.
The second interpretation of the word “right” is in the sense of “right” as opposed to “wrong”, that is, “morally right”. This leads to a highly productive discussion.
A lover (participant of an affair) has a duty to keep silent about it. Exposing the affair is a breach of this duty. Hence, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
Telling the truth is a morally right thing to do. Exposing the affair is an instantiation of telling the truth. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
However, this so-called telling the truth may not be done out of an intention to tell the truth, but rather done out of malice eg. to get back at the partner for some perceived transgression. Acting out of malice is a morally wrong act. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of malice, then that is a morally wrong act.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant says a morally right act is one that can be applied to everyone (the technical word is “universalized”) without self-contradiction. (That’s one of Kant’s definitions.) We apply this test to the question. What if every lover advertises his or her affair? Does any self-contradiction arise? We note that France is reputed to be one country where dalliances are a common and known occurrence – and French society has not fallen apart as a result of it. Our question seems to pass Kant’s test. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
Showing remorse for an immoral act is a moral thing to do. Exposing an affair can be part of the act of showing remorse for having had the affair. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of the desire to show remorse for having had the affair, then that is a morally right act.
Having tested the question with Kant’s deontological (rule-based) ethics, we feel philosophically obliged to test the question also against Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian (consequence-based) ethics. If the benefits of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the harms of doing so, then the act is a morally right one. If the harms of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the benefits of doing so, then the act is a morally wrong one.
There are too many situations to make this computation. It cannot be done. Yes, it can. There are two versions of utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism considers the consequences of single acts. Rule utilitarianism considers the consequences of types of acts. We can consider “a lover exposing his or her affair” as a type of act, and compute the consequences.
Well, in general, if silence is maintained and everyone else is kept in the dark, then normal life just keeps rolling along and nobody is any the worse for it. On the other hand, it the lover exposes the affair, then many people become upset and great harm may be caused. Hence, in general, maintaining silence results in more benefits over harm, and exposing the affair results in more harm over benefits. Therefore, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
We have three arguments for “morally wrong” and three arguments for “morally right”. The only way to resolve this is to more deeply examine each argument to see if they are sound. However, the hour is late. We decide to stop the discussion here.
It has been a good discussion.
END
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on the third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, Singapore, from 8-10pm. Parking and admission are free (but personal expense for food and drink), and all are welcome (just bring an enquiring mind). The next session will be on 21 April 2010. Hope to see you there.
Our question for the evening is “Does a lover have rights?” After some vigorous efforts to define “lover” in its various versions, we decided we were better off rephrasing the question. And so the question for the evening became “Does a participant of an affair have the right to expose the affair?”
We perceive two interpretations of the word “right”. The first is a “freedom to do”, as in freedom to expose the affair. There is nothing in the law to say that a participant of an affair cannot expose his or her affair. Hence, he or she has the right to expose the affair.
The second interpretation of the word “right” is in the sense of “right” as opposed to “wrong”, that is, “morally right”. This leads to a highly productive discussion.
A lover (participant of an affair) has a duty to keep silent about it. Exposing the affair is a breach of this duty. Hence, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
Telling the truth is a morally right thing to do. Exposing the affair is an instantiation of telling the truth. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
However, this so-called telling the truth may not be done out of an intention to tell the truth, but rather done out of malice eg. to get back at the partner for some perceived transgression. Acting out of malice is a morally wrong act. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of malice, then that is a morally wrong act.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant says a morally right act is one that can be applied to everyone (the technical word is “universalized”) without self-contradiction. (That’s one of Kant’s definitions.) We apply this test to the question. What if every lover advertises his or her affair? Does any self-contradiction arise? We note that France is reputed to be one country where dalliances are a common and known occurrence – and French society has not fallen apart as a result of it. Our question seems to pass Kant’s test. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
Showing remorse for an immoral act is a moral thing to do. Exposing an affair can be part of the act of showing remorse for having had the affair. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of the desire to show remorse for having had the affair, then that is a morally right act.
Having tested the question with Kant’s deontological (rule-based) ethics, we feel philosophically obliged to test the question also against Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian (consequence-based) ethics. If the benefits of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the harms of doing so, then the act is a morally right one. If the harms of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the benefits of doing so, then the act is a morally wrong one.
There are too many situations to make this computation. It cannot be done. Yes, it can. There are two versions of utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism considers the consequences of single acts. Rule utilitarianism considers the consequences of types of acts. We can consider “a lover exposing his or her affair” as a type of act, and compute the consequences.
Well, in general, if silence is maintained and everyone else is kept in the dark, then normal life just keeps rolling along and nobody is any the worse for it. On the other hand, it the lover exposes the affair, then many people become upset and great harm may be caused. Hence, in general, maintaining silence results in more benefits over harm, and exposing the affair results in more harm over benefits. Therefore, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
We have three arguments for “morally wrong” and three arguments for “morally right”. The only way to resolve this is to more deeply examine each argument to see if they are sound. However, the hour is late. We decide to stop the discussion here.
It has been a good discussion.
END
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on the third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, Singapore, from 8-10pm. Parking and admission are free (but personal expense for food and drink), and all are welcome (just bring an enquiring mind). The next session will be on 21 April 2010. Hope to see you there.
Thursday, 18 February 2010
Is patience a waste of time?
This is a report of the philosophy café session on 17 February 2010. The question for the evening is: “Is patience a waste of time?”
What is patience? An online dictionary defines it as: “suffering delay, pain, irritation etc quietly and without complaint”. What is waste? The definition is: “fail to use [blank: which we fill with the word “time”] fully or in the correct or most useful way.”
Consider gardening. We cannot do anything but wait for the plants to grow. Not true, we have to add fertilizer, water the plants etc. Consider construction. Things must move according to a determined timeline, waiting for events to move according to this timeline cannot be considered “waste”.
So it is not waste if there is a result. If there is no delay, patience is not called for.
What about patience as a virtue? Even if there is no result, character building can occur. This makes patience not a waste of time.
Hence:
If (either result or character building), then not-(waste of time); and
If not-(either result or character building), then (waste of time)
Patience is considered a virtue because we do not know the future eg. a farmer waiting for his plants to grow. Anything can happen.
We suggest a metaphor. We lean a ladder against a tree (apple, pear etc) to pluck its fruits. If we lean it against the correct tree, and get the fruits, it is not a waste of time. If we lean it against the wrong tree, and do not get the fruits, it is a waste of time. But what if we carry the ladder into an orchard, and do not know which is the right tree, leaving us no choice but to try many trees, is that a waste of time? Well, in the same way as Edison discovered many ways in which electricity cannot generate light, we gain knowledge by climbing up many wrong trees. Since our patience in climbing many wrong trees allows us to gain knowledge, it is not a waste of time.
Gaining knowledge is not character building. It is a result.
What about doomsday cults waiting for the end of the world? The end of the world is an event not likely to happen anytime in the near future. Is their patience then a waste of time? Well, we do not know that the end of the world is an event not likely to happen anytime in the near future.
Waiting in ignorance is a waste of time. No, because the future is always unknown, so it is not a waste of time. Thus, because the future is always unknown, it is not the case that:
If not-(either result or character building), then (waste of time).
We had earlier established that:
If (either result or character building), then not-(waste of time)
We now establish that:
If not-(either result or character building), then not-(waste of time)
But, it must be either:
(either result or character building) or not-(either result or character building)
Thus, patience is never a waste of time.
We can say the future is never known only when we look ahead in time. However, when we engage hindsight, we are able to say that “there is no result, or there is a bad result, or no character development occurred”, and hence that “patience was a waste of time”.
What if we had pessimistic foresight? This yields only an anticipated waste of time, rather than an actual waste of time.
We refer back to the definition of patience. It involves complaint. If we have a pessimistic foresight, and we complain about it, we do not have patience. The question dissolves. If we have pessimistic foresight and we do not complain about it, we are patient, but we are still dealing with anticipated waste of time rather than actual waste of time.
The word “patience” is used only in foresight. Judgement is exercised only in hindsight. In foresight, patience is never a waste of time. Hence, patience is not a waste of time.
What about procrastination? So far, we have been discussing patience in terms of passively waiting for some event to occur. Procrastination is also a kind of patience, waiting to perform some action.
We note the pejorative flavour of the word “procrastination”, which will bias the discussion. We decide to ignore this pejorative flavour, and focus only on the literal meaning of the word: “to delay action”.
Is procrastination (as a form of patience) a waste of time?
If procrastination leads to a result, then it is not a waste of time. But this is known only in hindsight. When we procrastinate, we are necessarily looking ahead, but because the future is always unknown, such patience is never a waste of time.
In conclusion, however we look at it, patience is never a waste of time.
It has been an extremely productive discussion.
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on every third Wednesday of the month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, from 8-10pm. All enquiring minds are welcome, there is no other prerequisite. It's free parking and free admission, with personal expense for food and drink. The next philosophy cafe session will be held on 17 March 2010. Hope to see you there.
What is patience? An online dictionary defines it as: “suffering delay, pain, irritation etc quietly and without complaint”. What is waste? The definition is: “fail to use [blank: which we fill with the word “time”] fully or in the correct or most useful way.”
Consider gardening. We cannot do anything but wait for the plants to grow. Not true, we have to add fertilizer, water the plants etc. Consider construction. Things must move according to a determined timeline, waiting for events to move according to this timeline cannot be considered “waste”.
So it is not waste if there is a result. If there is no delay, patience is not called for.
What about patience as a virtue? Even if there is no result, character building can occur. This makes patience not a waste of time.
Hence:
If (either result or character building), then not-(waste of time); and
If not-(either result or character building), then (waste of time)
Patience is considered a virtue because we do not know the future eg. a farmer waiting for his plants to grow. Anything can happen.
We suggest a metaphor. We lean a ladder against a tree (apple, pear etc) to pluck its fruits. If we lean it against the correct tree, and get the fruits, it is not a waste of time. If we lean it against the wrong tree, and do not get the fruits, it is a waste of time. But what if we carry the ladder into an orchard, and do not know which is the right tree, leaving us no choice but to try many trees, is that a waste of time? Well, in the same way as Edison discovered many ways in which electricity cannot generate light, we gain knowledge by climbing up many wrong trees. Since our patience in climbing many wrong trees allows us to gain knowledge, it is not a waste of time.
Gaining knowledge is not character building. It is a result.
What about doomsday cults waiting for the end of the world? The end of the world is an event not likely to happen anytime in the near future. Is their patience then a waste of time? Well, we do not know that the end of the world is an event not likely to happen anytime in the near future.
Waiting in ignorance is a waste of time. No, because the future is always unknown, so it is not a waste of time. Thus, because the future is always unknown, it is not the case that:
If not-(either result or character building), then (waste of time).
We had earlier established that:
If (either result or character building), then not-(waste of time)
We now establish that:
If not-(either result or character building), then not-(waste of time)
But, it must be either:
(either result or character building) or not-(either result or character building)
Thus, patience is never a waste of time.
We can say the future is never known only when we look ahead in time. However, when we engage hindsight, we are able to say that “there is no result, or there is a bad result, or no character development occurred”, and hence that “patience was a waste of time”.
What if we had pessimistic foresight? This yields only an anticipated waste of time, rather than an actual waste of time.
We refer back to the definition of patience. It involves complaint. If we have a pessimistic foresight, and we complain about it, we do not have patience. The question dissolves. If we have pessimistic foresight and we do not complain about it, we are patient, but we are still dealing with anticipated waste of time rather than actual waste of time.
The word “patience” is used only in foresight. Judgement is exercised only in hindsight. In foresight, patience is never a waste of time. Hence, patience is not a waste of time.
What about procrastination? So far, we have been discussing patience in terms of passively waiting for some event to occur. Procrastination is also a kind of patience, waiting to perform some action.
We note the pejorative flavour of the word “procrastination”, which will bias the discussion. We decide to ignore this pejorative flavour, and focus only on the literal meaning of the word: “to delay action”.
Is procrastination (as a form of patience) a waste of time?
If procrastination leads to a result, then it is not a waste of time. But this is known only in hindsight. When we procrastinate, we are necessarily looking ahead, but because the future is always unknown, such patience is never a waste of time.
In conclusion, however we look at it, patience is never a waste of time.
It has been an extremely productive discussion.
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on every third Wednesday of the month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, from 8-10pm. All enquiring minds are welcome, there is no other prerequisite. It's free parking and free admission, with personal expense for food and drink. The next philosophy cafe session will be held on 17 March 2010. Hope to see you there.
Saturday, 13 February 2010
Is having a child important in a marriage?
This is a report of the second question attempted at philosophy cafe's first commercial outing -- on 12 February 2010 -- as an event organised by a dating agency (www.champagnejsg.com).
Only if one is prepared to be responsible for a child should one have a child.
Whether or not this is true, the claim does not address the question, which is about the importance of a child in a marriage.
Marriage is defined as heterosexual marriage, for the simple reason that this is the only kind of marriage that can produce children.
What does the word "important" mean? It means "to produce children". No, that would mean that a childless couple in their 80s are then by definition not married. That cannot be right. This understanding of the word "important" does not work.
What is marriage? It's a question discussed in the philosophy cafe session of 18 November 2009. It so happens I have the notes from that evening with me. We take the conclusion from that evening's discussion. Marriage is a man-made construct with no intrinsic value. This means that marriage has no value in and of itself. This does not mean that marriage has no value at all. It remains possible for individuals or couples to impose value upon it. Having a child can be one such imposed value.
Perhaps the preposition in the question is important. Is there a difference between asking "Is having a child important in a marriage" and "Is having a child important to a marriage"?
Phrased with an "in", the question relates to the species, as "does the species find it important?" Whereas, phrased with a "to", the question relates to a specific couple, as "does this, or any, couple (but not species) find it important?"
We run out of time. Discussion of this question ends here.
END
Only if one is prepared to be responsible for a child should one have a child.
Whether or not this is true, the claim does not address the question, which is about the importance of a child in a marriage.
Marriage is defined as heterosexual marriage, for the simple reason that this is the only kind of marriage that can produce children.
What does the word "important" mean? It means "to produce children". No, that would mean that a childless couple in their 80s are then by definition not married. That cannot be right. This understanding of the word "important" does not work.
What is marriage? It's a question discussed in the philosophy cafe session of 18 November 2009. It so happens I have the notes from that evening with me. We take the conclusion from that evening's discussion. Marriage is a man-made construct with no intrinsic value. This means that marriage has no value in and of itself. This does not mean that marriage has no value at all. It remains possible for individuals or couples to impose value upon it. Having a child can be one such imposed value.
Perhaps the preposition in the question is important. Is there a difference between asking "Is having a child important in a marriage" and "Is having a child important to a marriage"?
Phrased with an "in", the question relates to the species, as "does the species find it important?" Whereas, phrased with a "to", the question relates to a specific couple, as "does this, or any, couple (but not species) find it important?"
We run out of time. Discussion of this question ends here.
END
Can we change to be different?
Philosophy cafe has its first commercial outing on 12 February 2010, on the eve of the eve of Chinese New Year. It is used as an event in the calendar of a local dating agency (www.champagnejsg.com).
The question for the evening is, as usual, suggested and chosen by the participants in a popular vote. It is: "Can we change to be different?"
"Different" is defined as "not alike in character or quality". This definition is obtained from an online dictionary. Definition via dictionary is, in philosophy, known as "lexical definition". [This is an effective but little used method of definition in philosophy, with many philosophers preferring to write entire books on "The meaning of difference" etc.]
What is the "we" in the question? It refers to some basic nature, some essence. This is to be distinguished from an attribute eg. someone wearing a red or grey shirt.
Someone offers this argument: "I do not observe that my basic nature has changed, nor do I observe that my nephews' basic nature has changed. Therefore, basic nature does not change. We cannot change to be different." We point out that just a few individuals do not constitute a representative sample. We cannot generalise from this.
We need to exclude the natural maturity process from the word "change". This is because if we do not do this, then the question becomes entirely trivial: We all of us undergo the natural maturing process as part of growing up. We cannot not change.
An analogy from physics applies. An object continues in motion unless acted upon by an external force. This is from Newton's laws of motion. In the same way, we continue on our natural trajectory unless some big experience (external force) causes a change in us. For example, a patient hears a diagnosis of cancer, and a bleak prognosis for his expected remaining lifespan. This big experience can cause a change in the patient to the point of being different.
But there are instances also of criminals who enter and leave prison many times with no change in their criminal tendencies. This recidivism shows that so-called big experiences may not cause change.
The question is: "Can we change to be different?", not "Must we change to be different?" The fact of hardcore criminals does not detract from the fact that big experiences can change people to be different.
A different slant on the question: Can people change by choice to be different?, as opposed to some big experience forcing a change upon them?
We return to the cancer patient and the bleak prognosis. The bleak prognosis cannot be said to inevitably cause a change to a more depressed attitude towards life. It is possible that such news may provoke the patient into consciously choosing to grab life by the horns instead. Or, more mundanely, one can choose to stop smoking, lose weight etc.
To sum up: The answer to the evening's question is: Yes, we can change to be different. We can think of two ways in which this occurs. One, we continue on our natural trajectory unless some big experience causes us to change to be different. Two, we consciously choose the manner of our difference, and then work towards that.
We have answered the question for the evening.
The event still has some time to run. We decide to embark on our second choice question for the evening: Is having a child important in a marriage? [See other post]
END
The question for the evening is, as usual, suggested and chosen by the participants in a popular vote. It is: "Can we change to be different?"
"Different" is defined as "not alike in character or quality". This definition is obtained from an online dictionary. Definition via dictionary is, in philosophy, known as "lexical definition". [This is an effective but little used method of definition in philosophy, with many philosophers preferring to write entire books on "The meaning of difference" etc.]
What is the "we" in the question? It refers to some basic nature, some essence. This is to be distinguished from an attribute eg. someone wearing a red or grey shirt.
Someone offers this argument: "I do not observe that my basic nature has changed, nor do I observe that my nephews' basic nature has changed. Therefore, basic nature does not change. We cannot change to be different." We point out that just a few individuals do not constitute a representative sample. We cannot generalise from this.
We need to exclude the natural maturity process from the word "change". This is because if we do not do this, then the question becomes entirely trivial: We all of us undergo the natural maturing process as part of growing up. We cannot not change.
An analogy from physics applies. An object continues in motion unless acted upon by an external force. This is from Newton's laws of motion. In the same way, we continue on our natural trajectory unless some big experience (external force) causes a change in us. For example, a patient hears a diagnosis of cancer, and a bleak prognosis for his expected remaining lifespan. This big experience can cause a change in the patient to the point of being different.
But there are instances also of criminals who enter and leave prison many times with no change in their criminal tendencies. This recidivism shows that so-called big experiences may not cause change.
The question is: "Can we change to be different?", not "Must we change to be different?" The fact of hardcore criminals does not detract from the fact that big experiences can change people to be different.
A different slant on the question: Can people change by choice to be different?, as opposed to some big experience forcing a change upon them?
We return to the cancer patient and the bleak prognosis. The bleak prognosis cannot be said to inevitably cause a change to a more depressed attitude towards life. It is possible that such news may provoke the patient into consciously choosing to grab life by the horns instead. Or, more mundanely, one can choose to stop smoking, lose weight etc.
To sum up: The answer to the evening's question is: Yes, we can change to be different. We can think of two ways in which this occurs. One, we continue on our natural trajectory unless some big experience causes us to change to be different. Two, we consciously choose the manner of our difference, and then work towards that.
We have answered the question for the evening.
The event still has some time to run. We decide to embark on our second choice question for the evening: Is having a child important in a marriage? [See other post]
END
Wednesday, 27 January 2010
What makes a question philosophical?
A regular visitor to my philosophy cafe asked me this question after a session, saying knowing this will help him formulate questions to offer at future philosophy cafe sessions. Coincidentally, I had also thought about this very question during my Introduction to Philosophy course last year. Here is the answer I came up with.
A question is philosophical if it satisfies three conditions:
1. The question has not yet been answered by science.
2. There is more than one possible answer.
3. The question cannot be answered by conducting an experiment.
However, it does not follow from this that every philosophical question will be philosophically addressed. A very common practice is to immediately jump to an answer, and to tightly hold on to it against all objections. To philosophically address a question, one must:
1. Assume that the question can be answered.
2. Examine only the argument offered to support any proposed answer.
3. Separate the argument from the arguer.
I hope this will help all future participants of my philosophy cafe -- as well as everyone attempting clear thought.
END
A question is philosophical if it satisfies three conditions:
1. The question has not yet been answered by science.
2. There is more than one possible answer.
3. The question cannot be answered by conducting an experiment.
However, it does not follow from this that every philosophical question will be philosophically addressed. A very common practice is to immediately jump to an answer, and to tightly hold on to it against all objections. To philosophically address a question, one must:
1. Assume that the question can be answered.
2. Examine only the argument offered to support any proposed answer.
3. Separate the argument from the arguer.
I hope this will help all future participants of my philosophy cafe -- as well as everyone attempting clear thought.
END
Friday, 22 January 2010
Do beer ladies need a career path?
This is a report of my philosophy café session on 20 January 2010.
The question of the evening, selected as usual by a popular vote, is: “Do beer ladies need a career path?”
We begin by recognizing that the phrase “beer lady” does not refer to a specific person or job, but rather is a representative of a type of job, namely one whose shelf life is in concept limited by certain generally well known parameters. Another example of this type of job is “child star”. In both cases, the parameter is age.
Next, we define “career path” as “a set of jobs in a logical progression within the same industry or profession”.
Finally, we define “need”. A person needs a job when he or she would, if deprived of that job, languish in a state of despair.
Consider an entrepreneur. This job has a short shelf life, even though the entrepreneur cannot be fired from the job. If the business fails, the entrepreneur is no more. If the business succeeds, the entrepreneur becomes a manager. In either case, the entrepreneur has reached the end of his or her shelf life. There is no possible career path. Hence, the question must refer to an employee.
Employment occurs in an organization with a hierarchy, which makes career paths possible.
What about a lateral movement? Does it count as movement along a career path? Generally it does not, since there is no progression. However, if the lateral movements are part of a management plan for the given employee, then it is a career path.
An organizational hierarchy is needed to provide a rank, which is what enables an employee to do his or her job.
An employee needs a career path to provide motivation.
Beer ladies are not part of a hierarchy, hence they have no motivation. Not so.
First, in certain establishments, even beer ladies can be part of a hierarchy. They can become senior beer ladies, or even managers of beer ladies. We have in mind especially F&B establishments.
Second, it is possible to have motivation without a hierarchy. Increased cash revenue is also a strong motivator. Hence, a hierarchy is not needed; a career path is not needed.
So, where do beer ladies go when they hit their job parameters? They can take advantage of unplanned opportunities. There is no set path for them to follow; instead they travel a flexible path that responds to the moment in time.
Beer ladies do not need a career path; a series of jobs will serve them just as well.
Our question is answered.
Philosophy café sessions are held every third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, 8-10pm. All persons with enquiring minds are welcome. It’s free admission, but personal expenses for food and drink. Oh, also free parking. Our next philosophy café session will be on 17 February 2010.
The question of the evening, selected as usual by a popular vote, is: “Do beer ladies need a career path?”
We begin by recognizing that the phrase “beer lady” does not refer to a specific person or job, but rather is a representative of a type of job, namely one whose shelf life is in concept limited by certain generally well known parameters. Another example of this type of job is “child star”. In both cases, the parameter is age.
Next, we define “career path” as “a set of jobs in a logical progression within the same industry or profession”.
Finally, we define “need”. A person needs a job when he or she would, if deprived of that job, languish in a state of despair.
Consider an entrepreneur. This job has a short shelf life, even though the entrepreneur cannot be fired from the job. If the business fails, the entrepreneur is no more. If the business succeeds, the entrepreneur becomes a manager. In either case, the entrepreneur has reached the end of his or her shelf life. There is no possible career path. Hence, the question must refer to an employee.
Employment occurs in an organization with a hierarchy, which makes career paths possible.
What about a lateral movement? Does it count as movement along a career path? Generally it does not, since there is no progression. However, if the lateral movements are part of a management plan for the given employee, then it is a career path.
An organizational hierarchy is needed to provide a rank, which is what enables an employee to do his or her job.
An employee needs a career path to provide motivation.
Beer ladies are not part of a hierarchy, hence they have no motivation. Not so.
First, in certain establishments, even beer ladies can be part of a hierarchy. They can become senior beer ladies, or even managers of beer ladies. We have in mind especially F&B establishments.
Second, it is possible to have motivation without a hierarchy. Increased cash revenue is also a strong motivator. Hence, a hierarchy is not needed; a career path is not needed.
So, where do beer ladies go when they hit their job parameters? They can take advantage of unplanned opportunities. There is no set path for them to follow; instead they travel a flexible path that responds to the moment in time.
Beer ladies do not need a career path; a series of jobs will serve them just as well.
Our question is answered.
Philosophy café sessions are held every third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, 8-10pm. All persons with enquiring minds are welcome. It’s free admission, but personal expenses for food and drink. Oh, also free parking. Our next philosophy café session will be on 17 February 2010.
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