Should Julie abort the baby?

This is my first post in a long time. I have been busy.

Last weekend, I took part in Raffles Institution's annual Inter-school Philosophy Dialogue as a facilitator. The group whose discussion I facilitated considered the following scenario.

Mariah is married to Johnny. Due to a gynecological problem, Mariah is unable to carry a foetus. The couple persuades Julie to be a surrogate mother for them. Julie agrees, as Mariah had once saved her daughter's life. The surrogacy procedure is successful. Julie becomes pregnant.

Four months later, a well-known Korean researcher discovers that foetuses develop binding unions with their prospective mothers while still in the womb. Alarmed by this, Mariah wants Julie to abort.

My group proposes several questions to discuss. By a popular vote, we decide on: Who has the right to decide whether to abort?

The case does not say if the couple's surrogacy contract (this necessarily exists) with Julie covers abortion, though it must necessarily cover birth delivery and handing over to Johnny and Mariah. We stipulate that the contract does not cover this contingency -- since if it does, then all we need to do is follow the contract terms.

We suggest that Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort, for two reasons. First, the foetus's DNA partly comes from her -- and not from Julie. Second, Mariah is the "employer" in the surrogacy contract -- which therefore gives her the right to make this decision.

It is suggested that Julie has the right to decide whether to abort, because of the binding union with the foetus. But has the union already formed? The case does not specify. Again, in a popular vote, we stipulate that the binding union between foetus and mother has not formed. Since no such union currently exists, Julie has no ground on which to claim the right to decide. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.

We consider the other branch: the bond has formed. There is nothing to say that a child is capable of forming only one binding union. Indeed, it is common knowledge that people (including adoptive children) are well capable of forming multiple binding unions. So, again, Julie does not have an overwhelming right to decide whether to abort. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.

We have answered the question -- through rational consideration. This is philosophy.

I ask the group (particularly the girls) if they are happy with the decision. Several say: That depends on whether I am in Mariah's situation or Julie's situation. I make the point that philosophy does not work like that. Rational thought does not guarantee outcomes that make the thinker happy -- or sad. Just right.

As we leave the discussion room (and proceed to lunch), I make another point: Nobody had even suggested that Johnny has any say in the matter. It's only about the women.

Now, isn't that interesting?