This is a report of the philosophy café session on 16 December 2009. The topic for the evening is: What does it mean to be cheating in a relationship?
Is “cheating” only physical? We cannot separate the physical from the non-physical. The thought of cheating is already cheating. Let’s be specific, thoughts of what? Thoughts of dinner, dating, sex – are these all physical?
Our first try at defining “cheating”: It is the undermining of the exclusiveness of a romantic relationship.
Is a relationship confined to two persons? No, it can be more than two.
Exclusiveness is a state of mind, the thought of being exclusive, of belonging to the group (may be two, or more). Belonging means not having any intimate physical relationship outside the group. Intimate physical relationship means touch, including sex and holding hands; but not flirting (because no touch involved).
Cheating is the undermining of the tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship.
What if a couple uses a third person to have a child?
One husband is allowed to have extramarital sex provided he uses condoms, pays for the sex, and is home by 7am the next day. This arrangement is with the wife’s agreement – even though she is unhappy about it.
Is agreement important in cheating? If there is agreement, then the relationship is not undermined. Therefore, there is no cheating.
Cheating is the undermining of the tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship without agreement from the group.
Some Hong Kong millionaires maintain several mistresses, with their wives’ agreement. It is economic circumstances that force the wives to agree. It is not a freely granted agreement.
Cheating is the undermining of the tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship without freely granted agreement from the group.
Is knowledge of the act important? If the other persons in the group know about it, then it is not cheating. It is cheating only if the other persons in the group do not know about the alleged cheating act.
Cheating is the undermining of the tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship without freely granted agreement from the group, and without the other persons in the group knowing about it.
What about intention to start another relationship? Yes, if there is such an intention, then it is cheating; if there is not such an intention, then it is not cheating.
Cheating is the undermining of the tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship without freely granted agreement from the group, without the other persons in the group knowing about it, and with the intention to start another relationship.
What about people who engage in wife swapping? There is freely granted agreement, there is knowledge, and there is no intention to start a new relationship. Is such wife swapping arrangements cases of cheating? On the present definition, it is not cheating.
What about colleagues who like, even “love”, each other, but who never touch each other? Is this cheating? On our present definition, it is not cheating.
What if a member of the group gets raped? Has she (or he) cheated? We run through the criteria. There is touch, it is with someone outside the group, there is no freely granted agreement, the group do not know about it, and there is no intention to start another relationship. By the current definition, the rape victim is guilty of cheating.
We are aghast at this result. The definition needs to be further improved, specifically the criterion of touch (captured in the criterion of exclusivity).
It is not cheating if the touch is forced upon the person being touched.
Cheating is the undermining of the unforced tactile exclusiveness of a romantic relationship without freely granted agreement from the group, without the other persons in the group knowing about it, and with the intention to start another relationship.
What about internet liaisons? There is no touch involved. It is not cheating.
But it is cheating! We have to change the “touch” criterion. Exclusivity should be defined as “behaviours or thoughts that fulfill romantic or sexual desires”. This will make internet liaisons instances of cheating.
This definition will also make cheating include the reading of romantic novels, having crushes on someone, becoming fanatical over movie characters in films like Twilight, and even autoeroticism.
This result is absurd! This amendment must be rejected.
It is 10pm. Discussion stops here.
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on every third Wednesday of the month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, from 8-10pm. I define philosophy as "the rational and rigorous pursuit of truth". Participants choose the topic by a popular vote. There is no prerequisite, educational or otherwise -- except for that of a curious mind. It's free admission, with personal expenses for food and drink. All are welcome. Our next philosophy cafe session is on 20 January 2010. I hope to see you there.
Friday, 18 December 2009
Tuesday, 1 December 2009
Should laws on Federal Reserve be changed?
US Federal Reserve Ben S Bernanke and others comment on proposed legislation covering the central bank. We analyse the comments.
Headline: Fed fix flawed: Bernanke
Source: Today, 30/11/9
Quote1
WASHINGTON: In a commentary in the Washington Post yesterday, he [chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben S Bernanke] sharply criticised a Senate provision that he said "would strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers" and a House provision to repeal a 30-year-old law "to protect monetary policy from short-term political influence". "A number of the legislative proposals being circulated would significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions," he said. The measures "would seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US". ...
Comment1
We here see the start of a teleological (appeal to consequences) argument.
Argument A
If (pass new laws), then the following consequences:
1. strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers
2. un-protect monetary policy from short-term political influence
3. significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions
4. seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US
The unsaid part of the argument is that these consequences are all undesirable, and hence the proposed laws should not be passed. The problem now is that even when these are said, the argument is still incomplete. A complete teleological argument must consider all consequences to all affected parties, and only then should a decision be made, based on the nett benefit or pain caused by the proposed action (in this case passing the new laws).
Quote2
The 55-year-old Fed chairman has presided over the most expansive use of Fed powers since the Great Depression. While he has averted a financial meltdown, lawmakers and voters have voiced concern about taxpayer-sponsored bailouts and proposed the most sweeping dismantling of Fed authority since the creation of the institution in 1913. ...
Comment2
It turns out that the proposed laws are precisely designed to dismantle Fed authority. This being the case, Consequences 1, 2, 3 identified by Bernanke in Quote1 above are precisely the intended consequences. All Bernanke has achieved with his comments is confirm that the proposed laws will achieve their aims. What he needed to do was show that these three consequences are undesirable, and this he has not done. However, Bernanke's alleged Consequence 4 (seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US) is not affected.
Quote3
"Now more than ever, America needs a strong, non-political and independent central bank with the tools to promote financial stability and to help steer our economy to recovery without inflation," he [Bernanke] argued.
Comment3a
Now Bernanke strongly implies that the above Consequences 1, 2, 3 are undesirable. Since "America needs a strong, non-political and independent central bank", we clearly cannot:
1. strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers
2. un-protect monetary policy from short-term political influence
3. significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions.
Comment3b
But this raises a philosophical question: If the central bank is to be "non-political", then to whom is it answerable? Surely a central bank must answer to the government, and a government must, by definition, be political.
Quote4
Senate Banking Committee [sic] Christopher Dodd and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank have, however, criticised the Fed for lax supervision and want to create a single bank regulator -- a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
Comment4
We have a new argument:
Argument B
Premiss1: If (Fed performs lax supervision), then (create new agency)
Premiss2: Fed performs lax supervision
Conclusion: Therefore, create new agency
This is a Modus Ponens (If P then Q, P, hence Q) argument. It is valid. All that remains is to prove the two premisses true. No proof to this effect is offered.
Quote5
As economist Allan Meltzer, a Fed historian and professor at Carnegie Mellon University, said in an interview: "Congress has a lot of public support for an attack on the Fed ... They bailed out everybody in sight."
Comment5
"Public support" boils down to popularity. This is not an issue that should be settled by popularity. Here there should be a consideration of right or wrong, effective or ineffective. Hence, the fallacy Argumentum ad Populum has been committed, and this argument should be rejected.
Quote6
However, Mr James Glassman, senior economist ad JPMorgan Chase noted that while "the political pressure on the Fed is out there", the Fed "has done a very remarkable job managing the financial crisis and the recovery of the financial markets is a testimony to that. Of all the things to 'fix', why would we tamper with the one that actually has worked well?" -- The New York Times, Bloomberg.
Comment6a
"The political pressure on the Fed is out there" again refers to popularity, and is correctly ignored.
Comment6b
Here is the next argument:
Argument C
Premiss1: If (Fed is done a good job), then (no need to change laws)
Premiss2: Fed has done a good job [from Conclusion2]
Conclusion1: Hence, no need to change laws.
Premiss3: If (financial markets recover), then (Fed has done a good job)
Premiss4: Financial markets recover
Conclusion2: Hence, Fed has done a good job [to Premise2]
Both arguments have the Modus Ponens form, and are therefore valid. The premisses seem intuitively to be true. The arguments are sound, and therefore succeed.
Case analysis
Argument A: Consequences 1, 2, 3 rebutted. Consequence 4 stands. But the argument is incomplete, and raises the philosophical question of to whom should a central bank be answerable. In limbo.
Argument B: The argument is valid, but premisses not shown to be true. In limbo.
Quote5 commits the Argumentum ad Populum. Rejected.
Argument C succeeds.
Verdict: No need to change Federal Reserve laws.
END
Headline: Fed fix flawed: Bernanke
Source: Today, 30/11/9
Quote1
WASHINGTON: In a commentary in the Washington Post yesterday, he [chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben S Bernanke] sharply criticised a Senate provision that he said "would strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers" and a House provision to repeal a 30-year-old law "to protect monetary policy from short-term political influence". "A number of the legislative proposals being circulated would significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions," he said. The measures "would seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US". ...
Comment1
We here see the start of a teleological (appeal to consequences) argument.
Argument A
If (pass new laws), then the following consequences:
1. strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers
2. un-protect monetary policy from short-term political influence
3. significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions
4. seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US
The unsaid part of the argument is that these consequences are all undesirable, and hence the proposed laws should not be passed. The problem now is that even when these are said, the argument is still incomplete. A complete teleological argument must consider all consequences to all affected parties, and only then should a decision be made, based on the nett benefit or pain caused by the proposed action (in this case passing the new laws).
Quote2
The 55-year-old Fed chairman has presided over the most expansive use of Fed powers since the Great Depression. While he has averted a financial meltdown, lawmakers and voters have voiced concern about taxpayer-sponsored bailouts and proposed the most sweeping dismantling of Fed authority since the creation of the institution in 1913. ...
Comment2
It turns out that the proposed laws are precisely designed to dismantle Fed authority. This being the case, Consequences 1, 2, 3 identified by Bernanke in Quote1 above are precisely the intended consequences. All Bernanke has achieved with his comments is confirm that the proposed laws will achieve their aims. What he needed to do was show that these three consequences are undesirable, and this he has not done. However, Bernanke's alleged Consequence 4 (seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the US) is not affected.
Quote3
"Now more than ever, America needs a strong, non-political and independent central bank with the tools to promote financial stability and to help steer our economy to recovery without inflation," he [Bernanke] argued.
Comment3a
Now Bernanke strongly implies that the above Consequences 1, 2, 3 are undesirable. Since "America needs a strong, non-political and independent central bank", we clearly cannot:
1. strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers
2. un-protect monetary policy from short-term political influence
3. significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions.
Comment3b
But this raises a philosophical question: If the central bank is to be "non-political", then to whom is it answerable? Surely a central bank must answer to the government, and a government must, by definition, be political.
Quote4
Senate Banking Committee [sic] Christopher Dodd and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank have, however, criticised the Fed for lax supervision and want to create a single bank regulator -- a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
Comment4
We have a new argument:
Argument B
Premiss1: If (Fed performs lax supervision), then (create new agency)
Premiss2: Fed performs lax supervision
Conclusion: Therefore, create new agency
This is a Modus Ponens (If P then Q, P, hence Q) argument. It is valid. All that remains is to prove the two premisses true. No proof to this effect is offered.
Quote5
As economist Allan Meltzer, a Fed historian and professor at Carnegie Mellon University, said in an interview: "Congress has a lot of public support for an attack on the Fed ... They bailed out everybody in sight."
Comment5
"Public support" boils down to popularity. This is not an issue that should be settled by popularity. Here there should be a consideration of right or wrong, effective or ineffective. Hence, the fallacy Argumentum ad Populum has been committed, and this argument should be rejected.
Quote6
However, Mr James Glassman, senior economist ad JPMorgan Chase noted that while "the political pressure on the Fed is out there", the Fed "has done a very remarkable job managing the financial crisis and the recovery of the financial markets is a testimony to that. Of all the things to 'fix', why would we tamper with the one that actually has worked well?" -- The New York Times, Bloomberg.
Comment6a
"The political pressure on the Fed is out there" again refers to popularity, and is correctly ignored.
Comment6b
Here is the next argument:
Argument C
Premiss1: If (Fed is done a good job), then (no need to change laws)
Premiss2: Fed has done a good job [from Conclusion2]
Conclusion1: Hence, no need to change laws.
Premiss3: If (financial markets recover), then (Fed has done a good job)
Premiss4: Financial markets recover
Conclusion2: Hence, Fed has done a good job [to Premise2]
Both arguments have the Modus Ponens form, and are therefore valid. The premisses seem intuitively to be true. The arguments are sound, and therefore succeed.
Case analysis
Argument A: Consequences 1, 2, 3 rebutted. Consequence 4 stands. But the argument is incomplete, and raises the philosophical question of to whom should a central bank be answerable. In limbo.
Argument B: The argument is valid, but premisses not shown to be true. In limbo.
Quote5 commits the Argumentum ad Populum. Rejected.
Argument C succeeds.
Verdict: No need to change Federal Reserve laws.
END
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