In this wondrous land of acronyms, here's one I thought up recently.
PIQUE stands for Philosophically Interesting Questions for You to Examine.
I think it's quite nice.
END
Tuesday, 9 November 2010
Philosophy of religion
The cartoon strip "Non Sequitur" in The Straits Times of 6 November 2010 has Danae setting up her own church. She says: "I'm taking the doctrines from all the mainstream religions into one church to end all the fighting over who has the most peaceful religion."
It's a nice thought. Her strategy is that if all the main ideas from the mainstream religions are all incorporated into a single religion, then there will be no more reason for dispute -- since everyone would now agree on everything.
It's a fashionable thing to say these days: that all religions basically teach the same thing. It's nice diplomacy. Is it good philosophy?
I do not see how it is possible to integrate the various doctrines of a single God (eg. in the Judaeo-Christian tradition), multiple gods (eg. in Hinduism) and no god (eg. Buddhism). Or the various doctrines of going to a single place after death, returning to this earth in another life form after death, and passing into oblivion after death. These doctrines are mutually contradictory.
The mind is a voluntary organ. We let into it, or keep out of it, whatever ideas we choose. Those who wish to believe in a God or gods or no-god are free to do so. Those who wish to believe in a great posthumous reward or punishment, or reincarnation, or oblivion are also free to do so. Whether by reason of argument, faith or revelation, they are free to believe whatever they will.
The trouble begins when three additional steps are taken:
1. The religious doctrines I believe in are true.
2. You must also believe in the same doctrines that I believe in.
3. You must behave as my beliefs say you should believe.
Avoid these three additional steps, and Danae's ambition of peaceful religions can be realised.
END
It's a nice thought. Her strategy is that if all the main ideas from the mainstream religions are all incorporated into a single religion, then there will be no more reason for dispute -- since everyone would now agree on everything.
It's a fashionable thing to say these days: that all religions basically teach the same thing. It's nice diplomacy. Is it good philosophy?
I do not see how it is possible to integrate the various doctrines of a single God (eg. in the Judaeo-Christian tradition), multiple gods (eg. in Hinduism) and no god (eg. Buddhism). Or the various doctrines of going to a single place after death, returning to this earth in another life form after death, and passing into oblivion after death. These doctrines are mutually contradictory.
The mind is a voluntary organ. We let into it, or keep out of it, whatever ideas we choose. Those who wish to believe in a God or gods or no-god are free to do so. Those who wish to believe in a great posthumous reward or punishment, or reincarnation, or oblivion are also free to do so. Whether by reason of argument, faith or revelation, they are free to believe whatever they will.
The trouble begins when three additional steps are taken:
1. The religious doctrines I believe in are true.
2. You must also believe in the same doctrines that I believe in.
3. You must behave as my beliefs say you should believe.
Avoid these three additional steps, and Danae's ambition of peaceful religions can be realised.
END
Tuesday, 10 August 2010
When billionaires give to charity
Recently, several billionaires started a campaign to get other billionaires to pledge their wealth to charitable causes. This, of course, made the headlines.
When ordinary folk pledge their spare cash to charities, that is one thing. But when people whose individual wealth dwarfs the GNP of some countries want to give billions to charities, that is another thing.
In principle, it is the responsibility of a nation's government to look after the its poor, its illiterate, and its homeless. A government should not (but many do) abdicate this responsibility, leaving it to various charities to perform this function. If wealth of such magnitude becomes easily available to charities, that makes it so much easier for governments to ignore their responsibility.
More importantly, individuals do not have the political mandate to set the national agenda; only governments have that mandate. If these billionaires must give their money away, they should hand it over to the respective governments to dispense to their poor, illiterate and homeless citizens.
But there is a more basic question to ponder: Why must one become so rich?
Every person has the right to make a living, but this should not extend to crowding all others out of the jungle in the process. One should leave room for others to exercise their right to make a living as well. But, somehow, the quest for wealth recognises no limit.
Now some are perhaps finding their immense wealth a tad embarrassing. It's about time.
END
When ordinary folk pledge their spare cash to charities, that is one thing. But when people whose individual wealth dwarfs the GNP of some countries want to give billions to charities, that is another thing.
In principle, it is the responsibility of a nation's government to look after the its poor, its illiterate, and its homeless. A government should not (but many do) abdicate this responsibility, leaving it to various charities to perform this function. If wealth of such magnitude becomes easily available to charities, that makes it so much easier for governments to ignore their responsibility.
More importantly, individuals do not have the political mandate to set the national agenda; only governments have that mandate. If these billionaires must give their money away, they should hand it over to the respective governments to dispense to their poor, illiterate and homeless citizens.
But there is a more basic question to ponder: Why must one become so rich?
Every person has the right to make a living, but this should not extend to crowding all others out of the jungle in the process. One should leave room for others to exercise their right to make a living as well. But, somehow, the quest for wealth recognises no limit.
Now some are perhaps finding their immense wealth a tad embarrassing. It's about time.
END
Friday, 30 July 2010
Investigating Inception
Here's a quick post on the movie that so many commentators are raving about: Inception.
It's a great action movie, set in five different locales: Reality, and four increasingly deeper dream levels, each identified by a different physical setting (airplane, van, hotel, ice, beach). The dream levels are achieved by the simple plot device of declaring it to be so. Inception is really no different from any typical James Bond action movie set in several exotic parts of the world. The only difference is that instead of storyboarding the shifts as travelling across the globe, it is storyboarded such that the shift is achieved by entering a deeper level of dream. Neat trick.
Now for the dreams. The characters in the movie enter a shared dream in a location designed by an architect. We have no ordinary experience of people sharing dreams, but I suppose we can stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered).
However, we do experience solo dreams, and even occasionally a dream in a dream. But notice that our (unconscious) attention is always on only one level of dream at any one time. When we are in the first level of dream, we are not aware we are tossing and turning in our beds. When we are in our dream within a dream, we are not aware that we are already in a dream -- we are engrossed in the third reality. In short, we do not dream simultaneously at several levels -- but that is what happens in the movie. Well, perhaps we can also stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered -- but I do wonder how the "victim" has also mastered this skill).
What really caught my attention is the movie's initial premiss: that the only way to plant an idea in someone's mind is through inception -- invading someone's subconscious via his dreams.
This is just not true.
Pedagogues and demagogues have always known how to plant ideas in others' minds. They do it through newspapers, magazines, books, television, speeches, pictures, conversations, hints, satires, plays, novels; indeed, through any medium they can find -- even movies. There is absolutely no need to resort to anything so mysterious, difficult and complex as inception.
It may be claimed that only inception will work if we want the victim to think that his new idea is original to him. This again is not necessary. In our ordinary experience, we come up with many ideas that we believe originate with us, but it's just that we do not know where the seeds of these ideas come from. It could easily be from any one or more of the media mentioned above.
In conclusion, Inception is not a masterpiece (as so many say it is). It is an ingeniously disguised action movie. We have been inceived.
END
It's a great action movie, set in five different locales: Reality, and four increasingly deeper dream levels, each identified by a different physical setting (airplane, van, hotel, ice, beach). The dream levels are achieved by the simple plot device of declaring it to be so. Inception is really no different from any typical James Bond action movie set in several exotic parts of the world. The only difference is that instead of storyboarding the shifts as travelling across the globe, it is storyboarded such that the shift is achieved by entering a deeper level of dream. Neat trick.
Now for the dreams. The characters in the movie enter a shared dream in a location designed by an architect. We have no ordinary experience of people sharing dreams, but I suppose we can stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered).
However, we do experience solo dreams, and even occasionally a dream in a dream. But notice that our (unconscious) attention is always on only one level of dream at any one time. When we are in the first level of dream, we are not aware we are tossing and turning in our beds. When we are in our dream within a dream, we are not aware that we are already in a dream -- we are engrossed in the third reality. In short, we do not dream simultaneously at several levels -- but that is what happens in the movie. Well, perhaps we can also stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered -- but I do wonder how the "victim" has also mastered this skill).
What really caught my attention is the movie's initial premiss: that the only way to plant an idea in someone's mind is through inception -- invading someone's subconscious via his dreams.
This is just not true.
Pedagogues and demagogues have always known how to plant ideas in others' minds. They do it through newspapers, magazines, books, television, speeches, pictures, conversations, hints, satires, plays, novels; indeed, through any medium they can find -- even movies. There is absolutely no need to resort to anything so mysterious, difficult and complex as inception.
It may be claimed that only inception will work if we want the victim to think that his new idea is original to him. This again is not necessary. In our ordinary experience, we come up with many ideas that we believe originate with us, but it's just that we do not know where the seeds of these ideas come from. It could easily be from any one or more of the media mentioned above.
In conclusion, Inception is not a masterpiece (as so many say it is). It is an ingeniously disguised action movie. We have been inceived.
END
Tuesday, 13 July 2010
Philosophy cafe still interrupted
I have received some (not many) enquiries about philosophy cafe. My thanks to the enquirers.
I am currently working on a new format for the philosophy cafe. Also, I have not yet found a suitable new location to hold the sessions. (This is not the same as there is no suitable location to be found.)
When these two conditions have been met, I will inform readers as to the new location of my philosophy cafe sessions. As they say, please keep watching this space.
Thank you for your interest.
I am currently working on a new format for the philosophy cafe. Also, I have not yet found a suitable new location to hold the sessions. (This is not the same as there is no suitable location to be found.)
When these two conditions have been met, I will inform readers as to the new location of my philosophy cafe sessions. As they say, please keep watching this space.
Thank you for your interest.
Monday, 12 July 2010
Should Julie abort the baby?
This is my first post in a long time. I have been busy.
Last weekend, I took part in Raffles Institution's annual Inter-school Philosophy Dialogue as a facilitator. The group whose discussion I facilitated considered the following scenario.
Mariah is married to Johnny. Due to a gynecological problem, Mariah is unable to carry a foetus. The couple persuades Julie to be a surrogate mother for them. Julie agrees, as Mariah had once saved her daughter's life. The surrogacy procedure is successful. Julie becomes pregnant.
Four months later, a well-known Korean researcher discovers that foetuses develop binding unions with their prospective mothers while still in the womb. Alarmed by this, Mariah wants Julie to abort.
My group proposes several questions to discuss. By a popular vote, we decide on: Who has the right to decide whether to abort?
The case does not say if the couple's surrogacy contract (this necessarily exists) with Julie covers abortion, though it must necessarily cover birth delivery and handing over to Johnny and Mariah. We stipulate that the contract does not cover this contingency -- since if it does, then all we need to do is follow the contract terms.
We suggest that Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort, for two reasons. First, the foetus's DNA partly comes from her -- and not from Julie. Second, Mariah is the "employer" in the surrogacy contract -- which therefore gives her the right to make this decision.
It is suggested that Julie has the right to decide whether to abort, because of the binding union with the foetus. But has the union already formed? The case does not specify. Again, in a popular vote, we stipulate that the binding union between foetus and mother has not formed. Since no such union currently exists, Julie has no ground on which to claim the right to decide. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We consider the other branch: the bond has formed. There is nothing to say that a child is capable of forming only one binding union. Indeed, it is common knowledge that people (including adoptive children) are well capable of forming multiple binding unions. So, again, Julie does not have an overwhelming right to decide whether to abort. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We have answered the question -- through rational consideration. This is philosophy.
I ask the group (particularly the girls) if they are happy with the decision. Several say: That depends on whether I am in Mariah's situation or Julie's situation. I make the point that philosophy does not work like that. Rational thought does not guarantee outcomes that make the thinker happy -- or sad. Just right.
As we leave the discussion room (and proceed to lunch), I make another point: Nobody had even suggested that Johnny has any say in the matter. It's only about the women.
Now, isn't that interesting?
Last weekend, I took part in Raffles Institution's annual Inter-school Philosophy Dialogue as a facilitator. The group whose discussion I facilitated considered the following scenario.
Mariah is married to Johnny. Due to a gynecological problem, Mariah is unable to carry a foetus. The couple persuades Julie to be a surrogate mother for them. Julie agrees, as Mariah had once saved her daughter's life. The surrogacy procedure is successful. Julie becomes pregnant.
Four months later, a well-known Korean researcher discovers that foetuses develop binding unions with their prospective mothers while still in the womb. Alarmed by this, Mariah wants Julie to abort.
My group proposes several questions to discuss. By a popular vote, we decide on: Who has the right to decide whether to abort?
The case does not say if the couple's surrogacy contract (this necessarily exists) with Julie covers abortion, though it must necessarily cover birth delivery and handing over to Johnny and Mariah. We stipulate that the contract does not cover this contingency -- since if it does, then all we need to do is follow the contract terms.
We suggest that Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort, for two reasons. First, the foetus's DNA partly comes from her -- and not from Julie. Second, Mariah is the "employer" in the surrogacy contract -- which therefore gives her the right to make this decision.
It is suggested that Julie has the right to decide whether to abort, because of the binding union with the foetus. But has the union already formed? The case does not specify. Again, in a popular vote, we stipulate that the binding union between foetus and mother has not formed. Since no such union currently exists, Julie has no ground on which to claim the right to decide. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We consider the other branch: the bond has formed. There is nothing to say that a child is capable of forming only one binding union. Indeed, it is common knowledge that people (including adoptive children) are well capable of forming multiple binding unions. So, again, Julie does not have an overwhelming right to decide whether to abort. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We have answered the question -- through rational consideration. This is philosophy.
I ask the group (particularly the girls) if they are happy with the decision. Several say: That depends on whether I am in Mariah's situation or Julie's situation. I make the point that philosophy does not work like that. Rational thought does not guarantee outcomes that make the thinker happy -- or sad. Just right.
As we leave the discussion room (and proceed to lunch), I make another point: Nobody had even suggested that Johnny has any say in the matter. It's only about the women.
Now, isn't that interesting?
Friday, 14 May 2010
Beauty has no function in life?
This is a report of a philosophy café session held on 13 May 2010 in conjunction with date agency champagnejsg, at Tea Cosy in Plaza Singapura from 7.45pm onwards.
As usual, we choose our topic for the night by a popular vote. The topic is: Beauty has no function in life.
Often, we use the word “beautiful” to refer to things that are good or important. The claim here is that true beauty should exist for itself, rather than to serve some purpose. Beauty describes some ideal, such as a sunset.
Beauty can make one happy. Beauty can also be monetized eg. by models, actresses.
What if a depressed person sees a sunset? Would he or she consider the sunset beautiful? What if a loving couple see the same sunset? Would that sunset be beautiful? And not beautiful at the same time? What if there is a sunset which nobody sees? It makes nobody happy, can it be beautiful?
These questions are misleading. We are not asking if making one happy makes something beautiful. We are asking if being beautiful performs any function. Well, it does. It can make someone happy, it can be monetized. Beauty has a function.
The question is answered.
Regrettably, the question is answered too soon. There is not enough interesting discussion. The mistake is mine. I did not vet the question carefully enough to ensure it is a “rich vein” for philosophical discussion. In future, I must ensure the question for the night satisfies my three criteria of a philosophical question:
1. Science has not yet answered the question.
2. The question cannot be empirically answered.
3. The question must initially allow of several possible answers.
Oh well, live and learn.
Postscript for my regular philosophy café sessions: I have no update on the status of Nook café. So, temporarily, my philosophy café sessions will take a break, while I look around for a second venue. Please visit this blog for further news.
As usual, we choose our topic for the night by a popular vote. The topic is: Beauty has no function in life.
Often, we use the word “beautiful” to refer to things that are good or important. The claim here is that true beauty should exist for itself, rather than to serve some purpose. Beauty describes some ideal, such as a sunset.
Beauty can make one happy. Beauty can also be monetized eg. by models, actresses.
What if a depressed person sees a sunset? Would he or she consider the sunset beautiful? What if a loving couple see the same sunset? Would that sunset be beautiful? And not beautiful at the same time? What if there is a sunset which nobody sees? It makes nobody happy, can it be beautiful?
These questions are misleading. We are not asking if making one happy makes something beautiful. We are asking if being beautiful performs any function. Well, it does. It can make someone happy, it can be monetized. Beauty has a function.
The question is answered.
Regrettably, the question is answered too soon. There is not enough interesting discussion. The mistake is mine. I did not vet the question carefully enough to ensure it is a “rich vein” for philosophical discussion. In future, I must ensure the question for the night satisfies my three criteria of a philosophical question:
1. Science has not yet answered the question.
2. The question cannot be empirically answered.
3. The question must initially allow of several possible answers.
Oh well, live and learn.
Postscript for my regular philosophy café sessions: I have no update on the status of Nook café. So, temporarily, my philosophy café sessions will take a break, while I look around for a second venue. Please visit this blog for further news.
Friday, 30 April 2010
Ip Man 2 and philosophy
I have just finished watching Ip Man 2. It is a great action movie. The plot is thinnner than rice paper, but it's a great action movie.
English boxer Twister disparages Chinese martial artists as dancers rather than fighters, and scornfully challenges them to duels. Master Hung accepts the challenge. Twister beats Master Hung to a pulp. Master Hung refuses to surrender, saying that he cannot allow Chinese martial arts be insulted. The fight continues -- until Master Hung dies in the boxing ring.
After the funeral, Master Ip challenges Twister. He beats Twister to a pulp. At the post-fight interview, Master Ip says: "I did not fight Twister to prove that Chinese martial arts are superior to Western boxing. I did it to prove that even though people are not equal in social status, we are equal in deserving of respect." These philosophical words were greeted with a standing ovation -- by both Chinese and English members of the audience.
I have questions.
Master Hung fights to protest the insult to Chinese martial arts. Look around the world today. Many use violence to protest what they perceive as insults to them. The rest of the world calls the violent protesters names, which are seen as further insults, to be replied to with more violence. Is violence the correct answer to insults?
Master Ip said his philosophical words after he had beaten Twister to a pulp. Suppose Twister had beaten Master Ip to a pulp, or even killed him the way he had earlier killed Master Hung. I doubt then that the same philosophical words would have evoked the same emotional response, the same moral approval. It appears that the outcome of the fight is relevant to the truth of those words. Can this be?
People do generally say that respect is not freely given, but must be earned and deserved. One does not respect those not deserving of it. This directly contradicts the claim that all people are equal in deserving of respect. (Social status is irrelevant to this consideration.) Are Master Ip's philosophical words, emotionally evocative as they were in the given context, upon cold examination after all not true?
Enjoy the movie -- then think about it.
English boxer Twister disparages Chinese martial artists as dancers rather than fighters, and scornfully challenges them to duels. Master Hung accepts the challenge. Twister beats Master Hung to a pulp. Master Hung refuses to surrender, saying that he cannot allow Chinese martial arts be insulted. The fight continues -- until Master Hung dies in the boxing ring.
After the funeral, Master Ip challenges Twister. He beats Twister to a pulp. At the post-fight interview, Master Ip says: "I did not fight Twister to prove that Chinese martial arts are superior to Western boxing. I did it to prove that even though people are not equal in social status, we are equal in deserving of respect." These philosophical words were greeted with a standing ovation -- by both Chinese and English members of the audience.
I have questions.
Master Hung fights to protest the insult to Chinese martial arts. Look around the world today. Many use violence to protest what they perceive as insults to them. The rest of the world calls the violent protesters names, which are seen as further insults, to be replied to with more violence. Is violence the correct answer to insults?
Master Ip said his philosophical words after he had beaten Twister to a pulp. Suppose Twister had beaten Master Ip to a pulp, or even killed him the way he had earlier killed Master Hung. I doubt then that the same philosophical words would have evoked the same emotional response, the same moral approval. It appears that the outcome of the fight is relevant to the truth of those words. Can this be?
People do generally say that respect is not freely given, but must be earned and deserved. One does not respect those not deserving of it. This directly contradicts the claim that all people are equal in deserving of respect. (Social status is irrelevant to this consideration.) Are Master Ip's philosophical words, emotionally evocative as they were in the given context, upon cold examination after all not true?
Enjoy the movie -- then think about it.
Philosophy cafe interrupted?
When I went to Nook on 21 April (third Wed of the month), I found it closed. There was a blackboard notice saying it is closed for normal business but available for special bookings. My apologies to anyone who went there and found it closed.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
Tuesday, 27 April 2010
Does the Internet worsen polarisation?
Headline: Mad Max public square on the Internet
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
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