Recently, several billionaires started a campaign to get other billionaires to pledge their wealth to charitable causes. This, of course, made the headlines.
When ordinary folk pledge their spare cash to charities, that is one thing. But when people whose individual wealth dwarfs the GNP of some countries want to give billions to charities, that is another thing.
In principle, it is the responsibility of a nation's government to look after the its poor, its illiterate, and its homeless. A government should not (but many do) abdicate this responsibility, leaving it to various charities to perform this function. If wealth of such magnitude becomes easily available to charities, that makes it so much easier for governments to ignore their responsibility.
More importantly, individuals do not have the political mandate to set the national agenda; only governments have that mandate. If these billionaires must give their money away, they should hand it over to the respective governments to dispense to their poor, illiterate and homeless citizens.
But there is a more basic question to ponder: Why must one become so rich?
Every person has the right to make a living, but this should not extend to crowding all others out of the jungle in the process. One should leave room for others to exercise their right to make a living as well. But, somehow, the quest for wealth recognises no limit.
Now some are perhaps finding their immense wealth a tad embarrassing. It's about time.
END
Tuesday, 10 August 2010
Friday, 30 July 2010
Investigating Inception
Here's a quick post on the movie that so many commentators are raving about: Inception.
It's a great action movie, set in five different locales: Reality, and four increasingly deeper dream levels, each identified by a different physical setting (airplane, van, hotel, ice, beach). The dream levels are achieved by the simple plot device of declaring it to be so. Inception is really no different from any typical James Bond action movie set in several exotic parts of the world. The only difference is that instead of storyboarding the shifts as travelling across the globe, it is storyboarded such that the shift is achieved by entering a deeper level of dream. Neat trick.
Now for the dreams. The characters in the movie enter a shared dream in a location designed by an architect. We have no ordinary experience of people sharing dreams, but I suppose we can stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered).
However, we do experience solo dreams, and even occasionally a dream in a dream. But notice that our (unconscious) attention is always on only one level of dream at any one time. When we are in the first level of dream, we are not aware we are tossing and turning in our beds. When we are in our dream within a dream, we are not aware that we are already in a dream -- we are engrossed in the third reality. In short, we do not dream simultaneously at several levels -- but that is what happens in the movie. Well, perhaps we can also stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered -- but I do wonder how the "victim" has also mastered this skill).
What really caught my attention is the movie's initial premiss: that the only way to plant an idea in someone's mind is through inception -- invading someone's subconscious via his dreams.
This is just not true.
Pedagogues and demagogues have always known how to plant ideas in others' minds. They do it through newspapers, magazines, books, television, speeches, pictures, conversations, hints, satires, plays, novels; indeed, through any medium they can find -- even movies. There is absolutely no need to resort to anything so mysterious, difficult and complex as inception.
It may be claimed that only inception will work if we want the victim to think that his new idea is original to him. This again is not necessary. In our ordinary experience, we come up with many ideas that we believe originate with us, but it's just that we do not know where the seeds of these ideas come from. It could easily be from any one or more of the media mentioned above.
In conclusion, Inception is not a masterpiece (as so many say it is). It is an ingeniously disguised action movie. We have been inceived.
END
It's a great action movie, set in five different locales: Reality, and four increasingly deeper dream levels, each identified by a different physical setting (airplane, van, hotel, ice, beach). The dream levels are achieved by the simple plot device of declaring it to be so. Inception is really no different from any typical James Bond action movie set in several exotic parts of the world. The only difference is that instead of storyboarding the shifts as travelling across the globe, it is storyboarded such that the shift is achieved by entering a deeper level of dream. Neat trick.
Now for the dreams. The characters in the movie enter a shared dream in a location designed by an architect. We have no ordinary experience of people sharing dreams, but I suppose we can stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered).
However, we do experience solo dreams, and even occasionally a dream in a dream. But notice that our (unconscious) attention is always on only one level of dream at any one time. When we are in the first level of dream, we are not aware we are tossing and turning in our beds. When we are in our dream within a dream, we are not aware that we are already in a dream -- we are engrossed in the third reality. In short, we do not dream simultaneously at several levels -- but that is what happens in the movie. Well, perhaps we can also stipulate that this is possible with some (undefined) technology (which the characters in the movie have somehow mastered -- but I do wonder how the "victim" has also mastered this skill).
What really caught my attention is the movie's initial premiss: that the only way to plant an idea in someone's mind is through inception -- invading someone's subconscious via his dreams.
This is just not true.
Pedagogues and demagogues have always known how to plant ideas in others' minds. They do it through newspapers, magazines, books, television, speeches, pictures, conversations, hints, satires, plays, novels; indeed, through any medium they can find -- even movies. There is absolutely no need to resort to anything so mysterious, difficult and complex as inception.
It may be claimed that only inception will work if we want the victim to think that his new idea is original to him. This again is not necessary. In our ordinary experience, we come up with many ideas that we believe originate with us, but it's just that we do not know where the seeds of these ideas come from. It could easily be from any one or more of the media mentioned above.
In conclusion, Inception is not a masterpiece (as so many say it is). It is an ingeniously disguised action movie. We have been inceived.
END
Tuesday, 13 July 2010
Philosophy cafe still interrupted
I have received some (not many) enquiries about philosophy cafe. My thanks to the enquirers.
I am currently working on a new format for the philosophy cafe. Also, I have not yet found a suitable new location to hold the sessions. (This is not the same as there is no suitable location to be found.)
When these two conditions have been met, I will inform readers as to the new location of my philosophy cafe sessions. As they say, please keep watching this space.
Thank you for your interest.
I am currently working on a new format for the philosophy cafe. Also, I have not yet found a suitable new location to hold the sessions. (This is not the same as there is no suitable location to be found.)
When these two conditions have been met, I will inform readers as to the new location of my philosophy cafe sessions. As they say, please keep watching this space.
Thank you for your interest.
Monday, 12 July 2010
Should Julie abort the baby?
This is my first post in a long time. I have been busy.
Last weekend, I took part in Raffles Institution's annual Inter-school Philosophy Dialogue as a facilitator. The group whose discussion I facilitated considered the following scenario.
Mariah is married to Johnny. Due to a gynecological problem, Mariah is unable to carry a foetus. The couple persuades Julie to be a surrogate mother for them. Julie agrees, as Mariah had once saved her daughter's life. The surrogacy procedure is successful. Julie becomes pregnant.
Four months later, a well-known Korean researcher discovers that foetuses develop binding unions with their prospective mothers while still in the womb. Alarmed by this, Mariah wants Julie to abort.
My group proposes several questions to discuss. By a popular vote, we decide on: Who has the right to decide whether to abort?
The case does not say if the couple's surrogacy contract (this necessarily exists) with Julie covers abortion, though it must necessarily cover birth delivery and handing over to Johnny and Mariah. We stipulate that the contract does not cover this contingency -- since if it does, then all we need to do is follow the contract terms.
We suggest that Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort, for two reasons. First, the foetus's DNA partly comes from her -- and not from Julie. Second, Mariah is the "employer" in the surrogacy contract -- which therefore gives her the right to make this decision.
It is suggested that Julie has the right to decide whether to abort, because of the binding union with the foetus. But has the union already formed? The case does not specify. Again, in a popular vote, we stipulate that the binding union between foetus and mother has not formed. Since no such union currently exists, Julie has no ground on which to claim the right to decide. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We consider the other branch: the bond has formed. There is nothing to say that a child is capable of forming only one binding union. Indeed, it is common knowledge that people (including adoptive children) are well capable of forming multiple binding unions. So, again, Julie does not have an overwhelming right to decide whether to abort. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We have answered the question -- through rational consideration. This is philosophy.
I ask the group (particularly the girls) if they are happy with the decision. Several say: That depends on whether I am in Mariah's situation or Julie's situation. I make the point that philosophy does not work like that. Rational thought does not guarantee outcomes that make the thinker happy -- or sad. Just right.
As we leave the discussion room (and proceed to lunch), I make another point: Nobody had even suggested that Johnny has any say in the matter. It's only about the women.
Now, isn't that interesting?
Last weekend, I took part in Raffles Institution's annual Inter-school Philosophy Dialogue as a facilitator. The group whose discussion I facilitated considered the following scenario.
Mariah is married to Johnny. Due to a gynecological problem, Mariah is unable to carry a foetus. The couple persuades Julie to be a surrogate mother for them. Julie agrees, as Mariah had once saved her daughter's life. The surrogacy procedure is successful. Julie becomes pregnant.
Four months later, a well-known Korean researcher discovers that foetuses develop binding unions with their prospective mothers while still in the womb. Alarmed by this, Mariah wants Julie to abort.
My group proposes several questions to discuss. By a popular vote, we decide on: Who has the right to decide whether to abort?
The case does not say if the couple's surrogacy contract (this necessarily exists) with Julie covers abortion, though it must necessarily cover birth delivery and handing over to Johnny and Mariah. We stipulate that the contract does not cover this contingency -- since if it does, then all we need to do is follow the contract terms.
We suggest that Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort, for two reasons. First, the foetus's DNA partly comes from her -- and not from Julie. Second, Mariah is the "employer" in the surrogacy contract -- which therefore gives her the right to make this decision.
It is suggested that Julie has the right to decide whether to abort, because of the binding union with the foetus. But has the union already formed? The case does not specify. Again, in a popular vote, we stipulate that the binding union between foetus and mother has not formed. Since no such union currently exists, Julie has no ground on which to claim the right to decide. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We consider the other branch: the bond has formed. There is nothing to say that a child is capable of forming only one binding union. Indeed, it is common knowledge that people (including adoptive children) are well capable of forming multiple binding unions. So, again, Julie does not have an overwhelming right to decide whether to abort. Mariah has the right to decide whether to abort.
We have answered the question -- through rational consideration. This is philosophy.
I ask the group (particularly the girls) if they are happy with the decision. Several say: That depends on whether I am in Mariah's situation or Julie's situation. I make the point that philosophy does not work like that. Rational thought does not guarantee outcomes that make the thinker happy -- or sad. Just right.
As we leave the discussion room (and proceed to lunch), I make another point: Nobody had even suggested that Johnny has any say in the matter. It's only about the women.
Now, isn't that interesting?
Friday, 14 May 2010
Beauty has no function in life?
This is a report of a philosophy café session held on 13 May 2010 in conjunction with date agency champagnejsg, at Tea Cosy in Plaza Singapura from 7.45pm onwards.
As usual, we choose our topic for the night by a popular vote. The topic is: Beauty has no function in life.
Often, we use the word “beautiful” to refer to things that are good or important. The claim here is that true beauty should exist for itself, rather than to serve some purpose. Beauty describes some ideal, such as a sunset.
Beauty can make one happy. Beauty can also be monetized eg. by models, actresses.
What if a depressed person sees a sunset? Would he or she consider the sunset beautiful? What if a loving couple see the same sunset? Would that sunset be beautiful? And not beautiful at the same time? What if there is a sunset which nobody sees? It makes nobody happy, can it be beautiful?
These questions are misleading. We are not asking if making one happy makes something beautiful. We are asking if being beautiful performs any function. Well, it does. It can make someone happy, it can be monetized. Beauty has a function.
The question is answered.
Regrettably, the question is answered too soon. There is not enough interesting discussion. The mistake is mine. I did not vet the question carefully enough to ensure it is a “rich vein” for philosophical discussion. In future, I must ensure the question for the night satisfies my three criteria of a philosophical question:
1. Science has not yet answered the question.
2. The question cannot be empirically answered.
3. The question must initially allow of several possible answers.
Oh well, live and learn.
Postscript for my regular philosophy café sessions: I have no update on the status of Nook café. So, temporarily, my philosophy café sessions will take a break, while I look around for a second venue. Please visit this blog for further news.
As usual, we choose our topic for the night by a popular vote. The topic is: Beauty has no function in life.
Often, we use the word “beautiful” to refer to things that are good or important. The claim here is that true beauty should exist for itself, rather than to serve some purpose. Beauty describes some ideal, such as a sunset.
Beauty can make one happy. Beauty can also be monetized eg. by models, actresses.
What if a depressed person sees a sunset? Would he or she consider the sunset beautiful? What if a loving couple see the same sunset? Would that sunset be beautiful? And not beautiful at the same time? What if there is a sunset which nobody sees? It makes nobody happy, can it be beautiful?
These questions are misleading. We are not asking if making one happy makes something beautiful. We are asking if being beautiful performs any function. Well, it does. It can make someone happy, it can be monetized. Beauty has a function.
The question is answered.
Regrettably, the question is answered too soon. There is not enough interesting discussion. The mistake is mine. I did not vet the question carefully enough to ensure it is a “rich vein” for philosophical discussion. In future, I must ensure the question for the night satisfies my three criteria of a philosophical question:
1. Science has not yet answered the question.
2. The question cannot be empirically answered.
3. The question must initially allow of several possible answers.
Oh well, live and learn.
Postscript for my regular philosophy café sessions: I have no update on the status of Nook café. So, temporarily, my philosophy café sessions will take a break, while I look around for a second venue. Please visit this blog for further news.
Friday, 30 April 2010
Ip Man 2 and philosophy
I have just finished watching Ip Man 2. It is a great action movie. The plot is thinnner than rice paper, but it's a great action movie.
English boxer Twister disparages Chinese martial artists as dancers rather than fighters, and scornfully challenges them to duels. Master Hung accepts the challenge. Twister beats Master Hung to a pulp. Master Hung refuses to surrender, saying that he cannot allow Chinese martial arts be insulted. The fight continues -- until Master Hung dies in the boxing ring.
After the funeral, Master Ip challenges Twister. He beats Twister to a pulp. At the post-fight interview, Master Ip says: "I did not fight Twister to prove that Chinese martial arts are superior to Western boxing. I did it to prove that even though people are not equal in social status, we are equal in deserving of respect." These philosophical words were greeted with a standing ovation -- by both Chinese and English members of the audience.
I have questions.
Master Hung fights to protest the insult to Chinese martial arts. Look around the world today. Many use violence to protest what they perceive as insults to them. The rest of the world calls the violent protesters names, which are seen as further insults, to be replied to with more violence. Is violence the correct answer to insults?
Master Ip said his philosophical words after he had beaten Twister to a pulp. Suppose Twister had beaten Master Ip to a pulp, or even killed him the way he had earlier killed Master Hung. I doubt then that the same philosophical words would have evoked the same emotional response, the same moral approval. It appears that the outcome of the fight is relevant to the truth of those words. Can this be?
People do generally say that respect is not freely given, but must be earned and deserved. One does not respect those not deserving of it. This directly contradicts the claim that all people are equal in deserving of respect. (Social status is irrelevant to this consideration.) Are Master Ip's philosophical words, emotionally evocative as they were in the given context, upon cold examination after all not true?
Enjoy the movie -- then think about it.
English boxer Twister disparages Chinese martial artists as dancers rather than fighters, and scornfully challenges them to duels. Master Hung accepts the challenge. Twister beats Master Hung to a pulp. Master Hung refuses to surrender, saying that he cannot allow Chinese martial arts be insulted. The fight continues -- until Master Hung dies in the boxing ring.
After the funeral, Master Ip challenges Twister. He beats Twister to a pulp. At the post-fight interview, Master Ip says: "I did not fight Twister to prove that Chinese martial arts are superior to Western boxing. I did it to prove that even though people are not equal in social status, we are equal in deserving of respect." These philosophical words were greeted with a standing ovation -- by both Chinese and English members of the audience.
I have questions.
Master Hung fights to protest the insult to Chinese martial arts. Look around the world today. Many use violence to protest what they perceive as insults to them. The rest of the world calls the violent protesters names, which are seen as further insults, to be replied to with more violence. Is violence the correct answer to insults?
Master Ip said his philosophical words after he had beaten Twister to a pulp. Suppose Twister had beaten Master Ip to a pulp, or even killed him the way he had earlier killed Master Hung. I doubt then that the same philosophical words would have evoked the same emotional response, the same moral approval. It appears that the outcome of the fight is relevant to the truth of those words. Can this be?
People do generally say that respect is not freely given, but must be earned and deserved. One does not respect those not deserving of it. This directly contradicts the claim that all people are equal in deserving of respect. (Social status is irrelevant to this consideration.) Are Master Ip's philosophical words, emotionally evocative as they were in the given context, upon cold examination after all not true?
Enjoy the movie -- then think about it.
Philosophy cafe interrupted?
When I went to Nook on 21 April (third Wed of the month), I found it closed. There was a blackboard notice saying it is closed for normal business but available for special bookings. My apologies to anyone who went there and found it closed.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
I do not know if the situation is temporary or permanent. I shall find out and update readers accordingly.
I have been running this philosophy cafe since October 2003. Some participants have suggested I conduct it at a more convenient venue. I have so far resisted the suggestion. I had two reasons. The relatively isolated and quiet venue of Nook is more conducive for philosophical discussion. More importantly, I was not confident I had found the right format for my philosophy cafe sessions. Now, after trying many formats over the past six years, I am at last confident of my format. So perhaps it is time to expand.
Philosophy cafe is not a fixed place. It is a concept and an event. Therefore, it is portable. If anyone knows of a suitable place, please let me know. If anyone has a group which would like to experience philosophising, please let me know. I can be contacted via comments on this blog, or through my email (link is on the left margin of this blog).
Please visit this blog again for updates on philosophy cafe sessions -- and other interesting posts.
Tuesday, 27 April 2010
Does the Internet worsen polarisation?
Headline: Mad Max public square on the Internet
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
Writer: David Brooks
Source: The Straits Times, 21/4/10
Quote1
In 2001, Mr Cass R. Sunstein, ... a professor at the University of Chicago, ... raised the possibility that the Internet may be harming the public square.
Comment1
The conclusion is "the Internet harms the public square". What is the argument?
Quote2
In the mid-20th century, Americans got most of their news through a few big networks and mass-market magazines. People were forced to encounter political viewpoints different from their own. ... Mr Sunstein wondered whether the Internet was undermining all this. The new media, he noted, allow you to personalise your newspapers so you see only the stories that already interest you. You can visit only those websites tht confirm your prejudices. Instead of a public square, we could end up with a collection of information cocoons.
Comment2
We are told there is a change from "force-fed information" to "self-selected information" -- and that this can lead to "information cocoons". Here is the argument, formally presented:
P1: If (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
The argument has the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q / P / Hence, Q) argument form. P2 is true, as a matter of general knowledge. Is P1 also true?
Quote3
Mr Sunstein ... has done ... work ... about our cognitive biases. We like hearing evidence that confirms our suppositions. We filter out evidence that challenges them. We have a ntural tilt towards polarised views. People are prone to gather in like-minded groups.
Comment3
Right. Here is the link that supports P1.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information) [cognitive bias]
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
C2: Hence, if (self-selected information), then (information cocoons)
C2 = P1
This has the valid Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R // Hence, If P then R) argument form. P3 is what Sunstein has found in his work on cognitive bias. P4 is true by definition. The argument is sound. P1 is true.
We return to the argument in Comment2. The argument form is valid. P2 is true. Now, P1 is also true. The argument (P1 / P2 // hence C1) is sound. Therefore, C1 is true -- we will develop information cocoons.
Quote4
Once in them (like-minded groups), they (people) drive one another to even greater extremes. ... Mr Sunstein's fear was that the Internet might lead to a more ghettoised, polarised and insular electorate.
Comment4
Thus, information cocoons in turn lead to greater polarisation:
If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation)
Quote5
Yet new research complicates this picture. Mr Matthew Gentzkow and Mr Jesse Shapiro, both of the Unviersity Chicago Booth School of Business, have measured ideological segregation on the Internet. ... But the core finding is that most Internet users do not stay within their communities. Most people spend a lot of time on a few giant sites with politically integrated audiences, like Yahoo! News. But even when they leave these integrated sites, they often go into areas where most visitors are not like themselves. ...
Comment5
This is not a complication. This is a direct refutation of P3. This says that when people self-select information, they do not go for similar information. It says P3 is false. This makes argument (P3 / P4 // hence, C2 = P1) unsound. P1 is not proven true. Hence, argument (P1 / P2 // hence, C1) fails.
Quote6
This does not mean they are not polarised.
Comment6
This quote relates to argument (P3 / P4 // hence C2) in Comment3. The word "this" in Quote6 refers to the denial of:
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
This denial does not lead to a denial of (information cocoons) and hence polarisation.
Here is the whole argument.
P3: If (self-selected information), then (similar information)
P4: If (similar information), then (information cocoons)
P2: (self-selected information)
C1: Hence, (information cocoons)
P5: (information cocoons) [from C1]
P6: If (information cocoons), then (greater polarisation) [from Comment4]
C3: Hence, (greater polarisation)
We deny P3. To go from (not-P3) to (not-C3) will commit the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent (If P then Q / not-P // hence, not-Q). So we cannot deny (greater polarisation). At the same time, we also cannot assert (greater polarisation), since we denied P3 in Comment3. Result: We do not know about polarisation.
Quote7
Looking at a site says nothing about how you process it or the character of attention you bring to it. It could be people spend a lot of time at their home sites and then go off on forays looking for things to hate. ...
Comment7
This illustrates why Denying the Antecedent is a fallacy. Denying one cause of a phenomenon does not preclude other causes of the same phenomenon.
Quote8
The study also suggests that if there is increased polarisation (and there is), it is probably not the Internet that is causing it.
Comment8
We have not been presented with any argument supporting the claim that there is increased polarisation. This is just the writer's assertion.
From Quote6 and Comment6, we saw that people not visiting confirmatory sites does not lead to any firm conclusion about polarisation. In Quote7, the writer says people could "go off on forays looking for things to hate".
Given these, I do not see how we can arrive at the conclusion that "it is probably not the Internet that is causing it [increased polarisation]."
END
Is Obama serious about Mars?
US President Obama has announced his space programme of a manned trip to Mars. Writer Gwynne Dyer is sceptical. We examine the arguments.
Headline: Obama's Martian odyssey more a charade?
Source: The Straits Times, 22/4/10
Writer: Gwynne Dyer
Quote1
In the real world, the United States is giving up on space, although it is trying hard to conceal its retreat.
Comment1
As in most essays, the conclusion is placed right up front. What is the argument for this conclusion?
Quote2
Last week, three Americans with a very special status -- they have all commanded missions to the Moon -- made their dismay public. In an open letter, Mr Neil Armstrong, the first human being to walk on the Moon, Mr Jim Lovell, commander of Apollo 13, and Mr Eugene Cernan, commander of Apollo 17, condemned President Barack Obama's plans for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) as the beginning of a "long downhill slide to mediocrity" for the US.
Comment2
These three persons are offered as authorities. They are astronauts, occupying a special niche in the US space programme. That does not give them an overview of the programme. This is a case of Argumentum ad Verecundiam -- appeal to false authority.
Quote3
The letter was timed to coincide with Mr Obama's visit to Cape Canaveral to defend his new policy, which abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020, or indeed ever.
Comment3
If the new policy explicitly "abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020", then the case is made that the US has given up on the Moon -- but not necessarily also the rest of space.
Quote4
Mr Obama insists that this sacrifice will allow the US to pursue a more ambitious goal, but his plan to send Americans to Mars by the late 2030s has the distinct political advantage of not needing really heavy investment while he is still in office -- even if he wins a second term. ...
Comment4
It is implied that the "political advantage" is the aim of the new policy. No proof is offered that this is so. It remains logically open for the "political advantage" to be just a byproduct of the new policy, and not its sinister aim.
Quote5
Those are indeed ambitious goals, and they would require heavy-lift rockets that do not yet exist. But the "vigorous new technology development" programme that might lead to those rockets will get only US$600m annually (the price of four F22 fighters) for the next five years, and actual work on building such rockets would probably not begin until 2015. ...
Comment5
At last we have an argument for the conclusion "give up on space" (GUOS). Here it is, formally presented:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument form is the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q/P//hence Q). We take P2 as an empirically true fact. However, P1 is not intuitively true -- starting work in 2015 suggests a resumption of space exploration, not "giving up on space".
Quote6
[Meanwhile, the US] will essentially be a hitch-hiker on other countries' space programmes. Mr Obama suggests that this embarrassment will be avoided because private enterprise will come up with cheap and efficient "space taxis". ...
Comment6
The notion of "space taxis" changes the argument presented in Comment5:
P3: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis), then (not-GUOS)
P4: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis)
C2: Hence, (not-GUOS)
This is a valid Modus Ponens. If P3 and P4 are true, then the conclusion must follow.
Quote7
No doubt they will get various vehicles up there. But if they can build something by 2020 that can lift as much as the ancient Shuttles into a comparable orbit, let along something bigger that can go higher, I will eat my hat. Space technology eats up capital almost as fast as weapons technology, and these entrepreneurs have no more than tens of billions at most.
Comment7
The "eat my hat" remark is a rhetorical device that rides on the valid Modus Tollens (If P then Q/not-Q//hence, not-P) argument form:
P5: If (lift Shuttles), then (eat hat)
P6: Not-(eat hat) [because impossible]
C3: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Now for the real argument:
P7: If (lift Shuttles), then (cost more than tens of billions)
P8: Not-(cost more than tens of billions) [entrepreneurs don't have such wealth]
C4: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Remember that (lift Shuttles) refers to the capacity of the "space taxis". So:
not-(lift Shuttles) = not-(space taxis)
This denies the truth of P4 in Comment6. The conclusion (not-GUOS) then cannot follow. GUOS remains possible.
Quote8
Does Mr Obama know this? Very probably, yes.
Comment8
The word "this" refers to "space taxis are not possible". This returns us to the argument in Comment5, which I reproduce here:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument goes only so far as to conclude GUOS. But there is a further claim (see Quote1) of "trying hard to conceal its retreat". No argument has yet been put forward to support this further claim.
Quote9
One suspects that he [Mr Obama] would actually be cutting Nasa's budget, not very slightly raising it, if its centre of gravity (and employment) were not in the swing state of Florida, where he cannot afford to lose any votes.
Comment9
Here is a hinted (it is not explicitly stated) argument for "trying hard to conceal its retreat". Here is a reasonable construction:
P9: If (tell truth), then (lose Florida votes)
P10: If (lose Florida votes), then (lose US elections) [because Florida is a swing state]
P11: Not-(lose US elections)
C5: Hence, not-(tell truth)
This is a Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R / Hence, If P then R) combined with a Modus Tollens. It is a valid argument form. The three premisses can be taken to be true. The argument is sound. We have a case for "trying hard to conceal its retreat".
Quote10
What is going on here is a charade.
Comment10
So we arrive at the final conclusion. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
That there is no real odyssey is argued for in Comment5, and repeated in Comment8. That there is a false front being put up is argued for in Comment9. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
END
Headline: Obama's Martian odyssey more a charade?
Source: The Straits Times, 22/4/10
Writer: Gwynne Dyer
Quote1
In the real world, the United States is giving up on space, although it is trying hard to conceal its retreat.
Comment1
As in most essays, the conclusion is placed right up front. What is the argument for this conclusion?
Quote2
Last week, three Americans with a very special status -- they have all commanded missions to the Moon -- made their dismay public. In an open letter, Mr Neil Armstrong, the first human being to walk on the Moon, Mr Jim Lovell, commander of Apollo 13, and Mr Eugene Cernan, commander of Apollo 17, condemned President Barack Obama's plans for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) as the beginning of a "long downhill slide to mediocrity" for the US.
Comment2
These three persons are offered as authorities. They are astronauts, occupying a special niche in the US space programme. That does not give them an overview of the programme. This is a case of Argumentum ad Verecundiam -- appeal to false authority.
Quote3
The letter was timed to coincide with Mr Obama's visit to Cape Canaveral to defend his new policy, which abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020, or indeed ever.
Comment3
If the new policy explicitly "abandons the goal of returning to the Moon by 2020", then the case is made that the US has given up on the Moon -- but not necessarily also the rest of space.
Quote4
Mr Obama insists that this sacrifice will allow the US to pursue a more ambitious goal, but his plan to send Americans to Mars by the late 2030s has the distinct political advantage of not needing really heavy investment while he is still in office -- even if he wins a second term. ...
Comment4
It is implied that the "political advantage" is the aim of the new policy. No proof is offered that this is so. It remains logically open for the "political advantage" to be just a byproduct of the new policy, and not its sinister aim.
Quote5
Those are indeed ambitious goals, and they would require heavy-lift rockets that do not yet exist. But the "vigorous new technology development" programme that might lead to those rockets will get only US$600m annually (the price of four F22 fighters) for the next five years, and actual work on building such rockets would probably not begin until 2015. ...
Comment5
At last we have an argument for the conclusion "give up on space" (GUOS). Here it is, formally presented:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument form is the valid Modus Ponens (If P then Q/P//hence Q). We take P2 as an empirically true fact. However, P1 is not intuitively true -- starting work in 2015 suggests a resumption of space exploration, not "giving up on space".
Quote6
[Meanwhile, the US] will essentially be a hitch-hiker on other countries' space programmes. Mr Obama suggests that this embarrassment will be avoided because private enterprise will come up with cheap and efficient "space taxis". ...
Comment6
The notion of "space taxis" changes the argument presented in Comment5:
P3: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis), then (not-GUOS)
P4: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015 & space taxis)
C2: Hence, (not-GUOS)
This is a valid Modus Ponens. If P3 and P4 are true, then the conclusion must follow.
Quote7
No doubt they will get various vehicles up there. But if they can build something by 2020 that can lift as much as the ancient Shuttles into a comparable orbit, let along something bigger that can go higher, I will eat my hat. Space technology eats up capital almost as fast as weapons technology, and these entrepreneurs have no more than tens of billions at most.
Comment7
The "eat my hat" remark is a rhetorical device that rides on the valid Modus Tollens (If P then Q/not-Q//hence, not-P) argument form:
P5: If (lift Shuttles), then (eat hat)
P6: Not-(eat hat) [because impossible]
C3: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Now for the real argument:
P7: If (lift Shuttles), then (cost more than tens of billions)
P8: Not-(cost more than tens of billions) [entrepreneurs don't have such wealth]
C4: Hence, not-(lift Shuttles)
Remember that (lift Shuttles) refers to the capacity of the "space taxis". So:
not-(lift Shuttles) = not-(space taxis)
This denies the truth of P4 in Comment6. The conclusion (not-GUOS) then cannot follow. GUOS remains possible.
Quote8
Does Mr Obama know this? Very probably, yes.
Comment8
The word "this" refers to "space taxis are not possible". This returns us to the argument in Comment5, which I reproduce here:
P1: If (US$600m a year & work starts 2015), then (GUOS)
P2: (US$600m a year & work starts 2015)
C1: Hence, (GUOS)
This argument goes only so far as to conclude GUOS. But there is a further claim (see Quote1) of "trying hard to conceal its retreat". No argument has yet been put forward to support this further claim.
Quote9
One suspects that he [Mr Obama] would actually be cutting Nasa's budget, not very slightly raising it, if its centre of gravity (and employment) were not in the swing state of Florida, where he cannot afford to lose any votes.
Comment9
Here is a hinted (it is not explicitly stated) argument for "trying hard to conceal its retreat". Here is a reasonable construction:
P9: If (tell truth), then (lose Florida votes)
P10: If (lose Florida votes), then (lose US elections) [because Florida is a swing state]
P11: Not-(lose US elections)
C5: Hence, not-(tell truth)
This is a Hypothetical Syllogism (If P then Q / If Q then R / Hence, If P then R) combined with a Modus Tollens. It is a valid argument form. The three premisses can be taken to be true. The argument is sound. We have a case for "trying hard to conceal its retreat".
Quote10
What is going on here is a charade.
Comment10
So we arrive at the final conclusion. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
That there is no real odyssey is argued for in Comment5, and repeated in Comment8. That there is a false front being put up is argued for in Comment9. The Martian odyssey programme is a charade.
END
Thursday, 18 March 2010
Does a lover have rights?
This is a report of the philosophy café session on 17 March 2010.
Our question for the evening is “Does a lover have rights?” After some vigorous efforts to define “lover” in its various versions, we decided we were better off rephrasing the question. And so the question for the evening became “Does a participant of an affair have the right to expose the affair?”
We perceive two interpretations of the word “right”. The first is a “freedom to do”, as in freedom to expose the affair. There is nothing in the law to say that a participant of an affair cannot expose his or her affair. Hence, he or she has the right to expose the affair.
The second interpretation of the word “right” is in the sense of “right” as opposed to “wrong”, that is, “morally right”. This leads to a highly productive discussion.
A lover (participant of an affair) has a duty to keep silent about it. Exposing the affair is a breach of this duty. Hence, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
Telling the truth is a morally right thing to do. Exposing the affair is an instantiation of telling the truth. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
However, this so-called telling the truth may not be done out of an intention to tell the truth, but rather done out of malice eg. to get back at the partner for some perceived transgression. Acting out of malice is a morally wrong act. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of malice, then that is a morally wrong act.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant says a morally right act is one that can be applied to everyone (the technical word is “universalized”) without self-contradiction. (That’s one of Kant’s definitions.) We apply this test to the question. What if every lover advertises his or her affair? Does any self-contradiction arise? We note that France is reputed to be one country where dalliances are a common and known occurrence – and French society has not fallen apart as a result of it. Our question seems to pass Kant’s test. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
Showing remorse for an immoral act is a moral thing to do. Exposing an affair can be part of the act of showing remorse for having had the affair. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of the desire to show remorse for having had the affair, then that is a morally right act.
Having tested the question with Kant’s deontological (rule-based) ethics, we feel philosophically obliged to test the question also against Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian (consequence-based) ethics. If the benefits of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the harms of doing so, then the act is a morally right one. If the harms of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the benefits of doing so, then the act is a morally wrong one.
There are too many situations to make this computation. It cannot be done. Yes, it can. There are two versions of utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism considers the consequences of single acts. Rule utilitarianism considers the consequences of types of acts. We can consider “a lover exposing his or her affair” as a type of act, and compute the consequences.
Well, in general, if silence is maintained and everyone else is kept in the dark, then normal life just keeps rolling along and nobody is any the worse for it. On the other hand, it the lover exposes the affair, then many people become upset and great harm may be caused. Hence, in general, maintaining silence results in more benefits over harm, and exposing the affair results in more harm over benefits. Therefore, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
We have three arguments for “morally wrong” and three arguments for “morally right”. The only way to resolve this is to more deeply examine each argument to see if they are sound. However, the hour is late. We decide to stop the discussion here.
It has been a good discussion.
END
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on the third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, Singapore, from 8-10pm. Parking and admission are free (but personal expense for food and drink), and all are welcome (just bring an enquiring mind). The next session will be on 21 April 2010. Hope to see you there.
Our question for the evening is “Does a lover have rights?” After some vigorous efforts to define “lover” in its various versions, we decided we were better off rephrasing the question. And so the question for the evening became “Does a participant of an affair have the right to expose the affair?”
We perceive two interpretations of the word “right”. The first is a “freedom to do”, as in freedom to expose the affair. There is nothing in the law to say that a participant of an affair cannot expose his or her affair. Hence, he or she has the right to expose the affair.
The second interpretation of the word “right” is in the sense of “right” as opposed to “wrong”, that is, “morally right”. This leads to a highly productive discussion.
A lover (participant of an affair) has a duty to keep silent about it. Exposing the affair is a breach of this duty. Hence, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
Telling the truth is a morally right thing to do. Exposing the affair is an instantiation of telling the truth. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
However, this so-called telling the truth may not be done out of an intention to tell the truth, but rather done out of malice eg. to get back at the partner for some perceived transgression. Acting out of malice is a morally wrong act. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of malice, then that is a morally wrong act.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant says a morally right act is one that can be applied to everyone (the technical word is “universalized”) without self-contradiction. (That’s one of Kant’s definitions.) We apply this test to the question. What if every lover advertises his or her affair? Does any self-contradiction arise? We note that France is reputed to be one country where dalliances are a common and known occurrence – and French society has not fallen apart as a result of it. Our question seems to pass Kant’s test. Hence, it is morally right for a lover to expose the affair.
Showing remorse for an immoral act is a moral thing to do. Exposing an affair can be part of the act of showing remorse for having had the affair. Hence, if a lover exposes the affair out of the desire to show remorse for having had the affair, then that is a morally right act.
Having tested the question with Kant’s deontological (rule-based) ethics, we feel philosophically obliged to test the question also against Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian (consequence-based) ethics. If the benefits of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the harms of doing so, then the act is a morally right one. If the harms of a lover exposing the affair outweigh the benefits of doing so, then the act is a morally wrong one.
There are too many situations to make this computation. It cannot be done. Yes, it can. There are two versions of utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism considers the consequences of single acts. Rule utilitarianism considers the consequences of types of acts. We can consider “a lover exposing his or her affair” as a type of act, and compute the consequences.
Well, in general, if silence is maintained and everyone else is kept in the dark, then normal life just keeps rolling along and nobody is any the worse for it. On the other hand, it the lover exposes the affair, then many people become upset and great harm may be caused. Hence, in general, maintaining silence results in more benefits over harm, and exposing the affair results in more harm over benefits. Therefore, it is morally wrong for a lover to expose the affair.
We have three arguments for “morally wrong” and three arguments for “morally right”. The only way to resolve this is to more deeply examine each argument to see if they are sound. However, the hour is late. We decide to stop the discussion here.
It has been a good discussion.
END
Philosophy cafe sessions are held on the third Wednesday of each month at Nook, 15 Chu Lin Road, Singapore, from 8-10pm. Parking and admission are free (but personal expense for food and drink), and all are welcome (just bring an enquiring mind). The next session will be on 21 April 2010. Hope to see you there.
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